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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A MORAL MANDATE & THE MEANING OF CHOICE:
CONCEIVING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AFTER NFIB
BRIETTA CLARK*
I. INTRODUCTION
In July 2012, the Supreme Court issued one of its most anticipated
decisions in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB)1
–– the constitutional challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA).2 One of the ACA’s primary goals is to improve access to
healthcare through expansions of public and private insurance.3 A focal
point of the private insurance expansion in political and legal debates has
been the “individual coverage requirement” or “mandate.” This is a
requirement that individuals either purchase a qualified insurance plan or
make an annual shared responsibility payment (also referred to as a
“penalty”). Proponents and opponents alike have viewed this “mandate” as
critical to the fate of reform.4
The ACA tries to expand private insurance coverage in a number of
ways: it increases consumer protections, like prohibiting insurers from
denying policies based on one’s preexisting condition; it replaces
individualized risk rating with community rating so that people are charged
the same regardless of their individual risk or conditions, making insurance
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. J.D. University of Southern California Law
School; B.A. University of Chicago. The author would like to extend a special thanks to the St.
Louis University Center for Health Law Studies for the opportunity to present this paper at the
30th Anniversary Symposium, Health Reform: The Act, Decision and Election. This paper
benefitted from wonderful conversations with the symposium’s participants, including Thomas
Greaney, Mark Hall, Timothy Jost, Paul Starr, and Sidney Watson, as well as from
conversations with David DePianto and Adam Zimmerman. All errors are mine alone. The
author would also like to thank the editorial staff of the Journal of Health Law and Policy, and
especially Katherine Ledden, Editor-in-Chief.
1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) [hereinafter NFIB].
2. Pub.L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in various sections
of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter ACA].
3. The ACA relies on a host of provisions designed to reduce cost, improve the quality of
healthcare and health outcomes, and expand access to care. See generally H.R. 3590, 111th
Cong. (2010).
4. See infra Part II (focusing on the mandate in the dominant political and legal narrative
around reform).
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more affordable for those who need it the most; it strengthens regulation of
insurance rates to prevent unjustified rate increases; it provides subsidies
based on income; and it creates new individual and small business
insurance markets in which consumers can easily compare and enroll in
insurance plans that are affordable and guarantee a minimum package of
essential health benefits.5 For this to work, policymakers believed that a
mandate was necessary to prevent people from waiting until they become
sick before buying insurance and to ensure that enough healthy people
would be part of the insurance pool in order to help spread the risk.6
Without a mandate, requiring insurance companies to cover everyone at the
same price, regardless of risk, would expose insurers to potentially
exorbitant costs and would lead to a “death spiral” of insurers fleeing the
market, undermining the ACA’s access goals.7
For opponents, the mandate served as a catalyst for attacks on “big
government.” Forcing citizens to buy insurance from private health insurers
was controversial across the ideological spectrum. But, for those seeking to
narrow federal power in the name of federalism, this mandate was seen as
a compelling example of the federal government’s threat to personal liberty.
Considered to be a novel exercise of federal power, the mandate also
generated widespread legal debate about whether it was an appropriate use
of Congress’ commerce power –– the legal focal point of challengers and
defenders of the law. Congress and the Obama Administration asserted the
commerce power as its primary legal justification for the law; according to
the government, the mandate was an essential link and a necessary and
proper part of an overarching regulatory scheme to solve a growing
uninsurance problem that significantly impacted interstate commerce.
Opponents, on the other hand, saw this as a viable opportunity to assert

5. For a comprehensive overview of the ACA, see KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SUMMARY OF
NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW (2011) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH REFORM LAW], available
at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf; see also Brietta Clark, Safeguarding
Federalism by Saving Health Reform: Implications of NFIB, 46 LOY. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013)
(describing the private insurance reforms).
6. See I.R.C. § 5000A (2011); 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2011); see also Ariane de Vogue,
Obama Administration Forcefully Defends Health Care Law’s Individual Mandate, ABCNEWS
(Jan. 6, 2012, 6:42 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/01/obama-administra
tion-forcefully-defends-individual-mandate/.
7. See Steve O’Keefe, Health Insurance Death Spiral, HEALTH CARE COMPACT BLOG (Jun.
26, 2012), http://healthcarecompact.org/blog/2012-06-26/health-insurance-death-spiral;
Ezra Klein, The Importance of the Individual Mandate, WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 16, 2009)
available at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezraklein/2009/12/draft_1.html. But see LARRY
LEVITT & GARY CLAXTON, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., IS A DEATH SPIRAL INEVITABLE IF THERE IS NO
MANDATE? (2012), available at http://policyinsights.kff.org/2012/june/is-a-death-spiral-inevit
able-if-there-is-no-mandate.aspx.
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more robust Tenth Amendment limits on a commerce power that was
already too expansive.
A counter narrative developed during this time that challenged both the
mandate label and the assumption that the commerce power was the right
legal justification.8 A handful of scholars and policymakers criticized the
“mandate” label as misleading, highlighting the fact that the law actually
gives people a legal choice to buy insurance or pay the assessment. A few
legal scholars argued that this legal choice, in fact, made the assessment
look like a tax on the choice not to buy insurance, and thus could be
justified under the taxing power. This counter narrative got comparatively
little attention in the mainstream debates about reform until the Court issued
its NFIB decision.9
Despite the overwhelming focus on whether the mandate was a
constitutional exercise of Congress’ commerce power, the Court upheld the
individual coverage provision as a valid exercise of Congress’ power to
tax.10 Central to the Court’s decision was a struggle over the proper
conception of the challenged provision: Was it a mandate to buy insurance
enforced through a penalty that must be justified by the commerce power,
or could it be viewed as a tax on the choice not to buy insurance that could
be more easily justified by the broader power to tax and spend?
The Court did not explicitly resolve the tension in these competing
conceptions. Writing for a majority of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts
treated both interpretations as reasonable for purposes of the constitutional
analysis despite the fact that every justice on the Court seemed to be more
persuaded by the dominant view –– that this was a mandate with penalty.
The Court’s decision to uphold the “mandate” under the taxing power
depended on a functional analysis of the coverage requirement that
ultimately defied this mandate characterization, however. Roberts explained
that the shared responsibility payment functioned more like a tax because
people retained a genuine choice under the law; no one would really be
compelled to buy insurance. As a constitutional matter, this looked like other
taxes used to regulate behavior previously upheld by the Court, such as “sin
taxes” on tobacco intended to encourage people to quit smoking.11
The Court’s reasoning drew significant criticism, even from reform
supporters, because of what some viewed as confusing and illogical

8. See infra Part III for a more detailed description of this counter narrative.
9. Throughout the paper, I refer to the dominant view as the “mandate with penalty”
frame, or I use the terms “mandate” or “penalty” as shorthand. To refer to the counter
narrative, I use the phrases “tax on choice” and “taxing choice” interchangeably, and use the
terms “tax” or “choice” as shorthand.
10. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the Court’s decision in NFIB.
11. 132 S. Ct. at 2596. See also infra Part IV.A.
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reasoning that failed to reconcile the apparent inconsistency between the
mandate and choice frames.12 More importantly, however, the Court’s
decision to uphold the “mandate” under the taxing power refocused our
attention on practical questions about the potential for reform’s success now
that NFIB has paved the way for implementation. If sin taxes, such as those
intended to discourage people from smoking, have not proven effective at
influencing behavior, how effective can a similar approach be for
encouraging individuals to buy insurance? NFIB may have saved the law
from constitutional challenge, but its reasoning underscores an equally
serious structural challenge in implementation –– the role of individual
choice.
There was remarkably little discussion about consumers’ choice in the
private insurance expansion before NFIB made clear that the ACA preserves
a legal choice for people to decide whether to buy insurance because the
amount of the “tax” or “penalty” is not significant or punitive enough to
undermine this choice. But punitive legal and economic sanctions are not
the only tools used by the federal government to influence behavior. The
compulsory rhetoric in the linguistic architecture of the ACA, as well as in
the government’s defense of the law, may have an expressive power to
influence this choice in ways that are difficult to predict or quantify. The
federal government, in conjunction with many states, is using the ACA as an
expressive platform to espouse evolving public values and social norms that
treat healthcare as an essential human and societal good. This message
also underscores a new moral obligation shared by all –– government,
employers, providers, insurers, and individuals –– to participate in a system
that ensures everyone can access this good.
Although the ACA does not effect a radical transformation of the
healthcare system, its success depends on this transformative idea of shared
responsibility. The ACA may not have created a true legal mandate, but this
Article argues that it attempts to create a “moral mandate” for individuals to
do their part by obtaining insurance.13 An understanding of this expressive

12. See infra Part IV.B.
13. The focus of this article is on the importance of consumers’ participation in the
individual market through the newly created exchange because this is where broad and
diverse consumer participation – particularly by “healthy” consumers – is important for risk
spreading that helps keep insurance premiums affordable for everyone. The challenge of
ensuring consumer participation also arises in the public insurance context, though with
different implications. In that case, the focus is on the health and financial risk of individuals
who fail to get important preventive or regular care that can prevent more expensive crises
later, as well as insuring against the financial risks borne by providers and individuals in the
event of unpredictable, catastrophic events. Individuals may fail to enroll in free public
insurance programs for a number of reasons, including stigma, fear of immigration-related
scrutiny if the individual lives in a mixed-status household, frustration from prior bad
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characteristic of the ACA helps to explain the Court’s struggle to reconcile
the apparent contradiction of the tax and penalty conceptions of the ACA’s
coverage provision. More importantly, it helps us understand and critique
the federal government’s attempt to leverage this expressive power to ensure
the consumer participation essential to reform. NFIB affirms the idea that
people will have a legal choice under the law. But can the federal
government, through the ACA, define the meaning of this choice in a way
that influences people to make the right one?
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II documents the dominant political
and legal narrative which focused on the individual mandate as key to the
reform’s fate in the Supreme Court and in implementation. Part III discusses
the counter narrative developed by scholars, such as Akhil Amar, Jack
Balkin, Neil Siegel, and Robert Cooter, which challenged the mandate
frame. Although most scholars treated the “taxing choice” frame as
providing an additional or alternative legal justification for the mandate,
Siegel and Cooter directly confronted the tension presented by these
competing narratives. They acknowledged the hybrid character of the ACA
coverage provision as having tax-like and penalty-like characteristics, and
provided the most robust discussion of the threshold question of how to
classify the provision for constitutional purposes.
Part IV considers the Court’s taxing power holding in NFIB, in light of the
competing narratives shaping the debate before the decision. This holding
generated dissatisfaction because of its failure to engage the threshold
question of whether the coverage requirement was really a mandate with
penalty or a tax on choice. This was especially problematic given that the
frame chosen proved to be outcome determinative for Chief Justice Roberts,
the swing vote in the case.14 This failure highlights the tension created by the
juxtaposition of a legal choice and an expressive mandate in the ACA.
Cooter and Siegel’s theory of how to treat such hybrid exactions helps fill in
some of the analytical gaps in the Court’s reasoning and provides support
for the Court’s taxing power holding. Ultimately, however, their theory still
leaves unanswered a fundamental question about how individuals exercise

experiences with government welfare agencies, and/or challenges navigating a difficult and
complex bureaucracy for determining eligibility.
14. The choice of framing did not appear to be outcome determinative for the other
Justices or for most legal scholars considering the merits under both the taxing and interstate
commerce powers. See Randy Barnett, The Unprecedented Uniqueness of Chief Justice
Roberts’ Opinion, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 5, 2012, 5:14 PM), http://www.volokh.com/
2012/07/05/the-unprecedented-uniqueness-of-chiefjustice-roberts-opinion/. Nonetheless, a
number of scholars and lower courts have reinforced the notion that the characterization could
be determinative by describing the taxing power as much broader and easier to satisfy than
the commerce clause. See infra Part II.
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choice, which is relevant to the constitutional question and predictions of
reform success.
Adopting a taxing choice frame assumes certain behavioral
characteristics of potential consumers in the new health exchanges. The
remaining part of this Article argues that the reasoning in NFIB, and in
Cooter and Siegel’s article, turns on predictions about these new
consumers’ behavior that may overvalue the significance of economic
sanctions in consumer decision-making, while devaluing the potential
expressive effect of the law’s moral mandate. Part V describes more fully this
expressive effect of law. Expressive law theorists have long noted that law
may influence people to comply with legal and social norms even in the
absence of legal enforcement or meaningful economic sanctions. Once one
understands the mandate/penalty frame as an expressive characteristic or
message of the ACA, it cannot be dismissed merely as a label or political
rhetoric. The ACA’s expressive characteristics should be taken more
seriously because of the potential for transforming norms and influencing
consumer behavior. The constitutional question has been decided, and the
Court may have had good reason for ignoring the law’s potential expressive
effect, but reform implementation is now underway, and consumer
participation is critical.15 As a policy matter, it is important to consider the
potential benefits and challenges of an approach that depends so heavily
on expressive force, rather than legal or economic sanctions, to influence
behavior.
To this end, Part VI considers the potential effect of the ACA’s expressive
mandate. Section A describes the harmful messaging and norms arising out
of a fragmented system and a loosely regulated individual insurance market
pre-ACA. Section B then considers how the federal government, through the
ACA, is using its expressive power to create a new legal and social norm
that obligates people to buy insurance. It is attempting to counter harmful
pre-ACA norms with new messages of shared responsibility, including a
robust role for government in protecting consumers and ensuring affordable
care. It is educating the public about the societal costs of the uninsurance
problem and the need for collective participation to solve this problem. And
it is trying to instill in individuals a moral obligation to the collective to
participate in this new insurance market. Section C considers more
specifically how and why the ACA’s expressive messages may cause people
to buy insurance. Whether legal choice in the ACA ultimately undermines
reform goals will depend, in part, on how effectively the federal government
15. For updates on the status of health reform implementation in the states, see State
Actions to Implement the Health Benefit Exchange, NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/state-actions-to-implement-the-health-benefit-ex
ch.aspx (last updated February 18, 2013).
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uses its expressive power to define the moral content of this choice, and how
many people embrace the ACA mandate as the new moral norm.
II. CENTRALITY OF THE “MANDATE” IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL NARRATIVES OF
REFORM
A.

Models of Reform Pre-ACA

Even before health reform was written, a central question and focal
point of debate was whether or not to include an individual mandate to buy
insurance. In the Democratic Primary Campaign for the 2008 election, it
was then-Senator Obama who attacked it and used it to distinguish his
approach from then-Senator Clinton’s plan.16 Obama decried the individual
mandate because he was convinced that people wanted insurance and
government would not have to coerce them into it. Government simply had
to use its regulatory power to create a fair, level playing field for those
traditionally excluded from the market by guaranteeing people access to
affordable and meaningful coverage.
Not long after the election, however, President Obama became
persuaded about the importance of a mandate. Obama’s healthcare reform
would preserve a private market system that depended on the participation
of private insurers. Without a mandate to guarantee a sizable enough pool
of healthy people for the new market, insurers might suffer exorbitant costs
and leave the market, causing a “death spiral” that would erode insurance
options for everyone in the individual market.17 Similar health reform
experiments by states that did not incorporate a mandate bore this out.18 By
contrast, Massachusetts, which relied on a system of combined benefits and
mandatory participation, achieved the kind of success that eluded other
states.19
Although it became clear that some kind of mandatory participation
would be needed, policymakers and legal scholars debated the exact
structure and design of the system. Anticipating significant opposition and
legal challenges to health reform, the Administration gave careful
consideration to the legal implications of different approaches it could take.

16. See Andrew Cline, How Obama Broke His Promise on Individual Mandates, THE
ATLANTIC (June 29, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/06/how-obamabroke-his-promise-on-individualmandates/259183/.
17. See id.
18. See NEERA TANDEN & TOPHER SPIRO, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE CASE FOR THE
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IN HEALTH CARE REFORM: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 1-2
(2012), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/02/
pdf/individual_mandate.pdf.
19. See id.
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In 2008, Georgetown Law School’s O’Neill Institute, in conjunction with the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, commissioned a series of papers to
propose solutions to possible legal issues that posed challenges to
healthcare reform, titled “Legal Solutions in Health Care.”20 As part of this
project, Professor Mark Hall provided an overview of the possible
constitutional challenges and likely outcomes to various aspects of the
private insurance expansion, including the individual mandate.21
In his paper, Hall identified two possible mechanisms the Administration
could use to achieve participation by individuals in the new markets being
created: one would be through a tax on the failure to buy insurance (called
a “play or pay” approach), and the other would be through a direct
mandate to buy insurance that would be enforced through some kind of
financial penalty.22 Hall described both of these mechanisms as legislating a
kind of insurance mandate, but he distinguished the commerce clause
justification of a “mandate” from the taxing power justification of a “play or
pay” approach.23 Hall noted that although the “play or pay” approach
differed somewhat from the U.S. Social Security System, it was well
supported by federal constitutional precedent. He also concluded that the
“‘play or pay’ option [would be] a bit safer because it would avoid any
realistic possibility of attacking compulsory insurance as a denial of due
process or an unjustified taking of property.”24 Thus prior to enactment, the
taxing “play or pay” scheme and the mandate with penalty were viewed as
alternative approaches to reform triggering distinct legal analyses.
Early versions of the bill also revealed lawmakers’ ambivalence about
the right approach to take, with some versions referring to the mechanism
used to ensure participation as a “tax” and others referring to it as a
“penalty.”25 Eventually, they adopted language that characterized insurance
20. For access to the papers commissioned for this project, see Legal Solutions in Health
Reform, O’NEILL INST. FOR NAT’L & GLOBAL HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/oneillinstitute/national-health-law/legal-solutions-in-healthreform/index.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).
21. MARK HALL, O’NEILL INST. FOR NAT’L & GLOBAL HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY,
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATES TO PURCHASE HEALTH INSURANCE (2009), available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/oneillinstitute/national-health-law/legal-solutions-in-health-re
form/Papers/Individual_Mandates.pdf.
22. Id. at 3, 7 (“We also assume that such mandates are enforced through financial
penalties, such as tax assessments or, at most, civil fines, but not through criminal law that
would result in imprisonment (or probation), absent some other criminal act (such as tax fraud
or evasion).”).
23. Id. at 7.
24. Id. at 7, 15-16.
25. See Health Care Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Dec 18, 2012), available at
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/health/diseasesconditionsandhealthtopics/health_insur
ance_and_managed_care/health_care_reform/index.html (giving an overview of the
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coverage as mandatory: the key provision is titled “Requirement to maintain
minimum essential coverage” and it provides that “an applicable individual
shall . . . ensure that the individual . . . is covered.”26 Moreover, those
subject to the requirement who fail to get coverage have to pay an
assessment labeled as a “shared responsibility payment,”27 also referred to
throughout the law as a “penalty.”28 President Obama abandoned his antimandate campaign position to embrace the mandate as a critical element
of health reform –– or so it appeared.
B.

Dominant Narrative of Challenges to the ACA

After the ACA’s passage, it became clear that the mandate would be the
focal point for political and legal attacks on reform.29 Politically, opponents
of reform viewed the “mandate” as a lightning rod to stoke federalist and
public fears of a federal intrusion into every aspect of our personal lives that
would ultimately destroy civilization as we know it.30 Such rhetoric was not
only used in the popular media and at town halls, it also made it into legal
briefs and court decisions making dire predictions of a parade of horribles
that would result if the mandate were upheld:
[T]he federal government will have the absolute and unfettered power to
create complex regulatory schemes to fix every perceived problem
imaginable and to do so by ordering private citizens to engage in
affirmative acts, under penalty of law, such as taking vitamins, losing weight,
joining health clubs, buying a GMC truck, or purchasing an AIG insurance
policy, among others. The term “Nanny State” does not even begin to
describe what we will have wrought if in fact the Health Care Reform Act

legislative and political development of health reform); see also Side-by-Side Comparison of
Major Health Care Reform Proposals, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://www.kff.org/healthreform/
sidebyside.cfm (last updated Jun. 18, 2010).
26. I.R.C. § 5000A & 5000A(a) (2011) (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 18091
(2011) (“Requirement to maintain essential coverage; findings”).
27. I.R.C. § 5000A(b) (2011).
28. Id. Several subsections of § 5000A refer to the shared responsibility payment as a
penalty. For example, § 5000A(b)(1) imposes a penalty on applicable individuals for failure to
meet the minimum coverage requirement; § 5000A (b)(2) explains the method by which a
taxpayer pays the penalty; (b)(3) describes joint liability for dependents and spouses who file
joint tax returns; § 5000A(c) describes the amount of the penalty; and § 5000A(e) provides
certain exemptions from the penalty.
29. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER PUBLIC OPINION: A SNAPSHOT OF PUBLIC OPINION
ON THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE 2 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/
8296.pdf (noting that “while the mandate is the least popular provision of the law, it is also
the most widely recognized”).
30. See Clark, supra note 5, pt II.
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falls within any imaginable governmental authority. To be sure, George
Orwell’s 1984 will be just the primer for our new civics.31

These arguments reflected a recurring theme of federal power as a
threat to individual liberty. Reform opponents viewed the coverage
requirement as an infringement on the right to make one’s own decisions,
on the right to be free from compulsory participation in a socialized medical
system, and on religious liberty.32 Even supporters of reform generally
objected to the idea of the mandate because it was viewed as a transfer of
wealth to the private insurance companies seen as untrustworthy, the cause
of many problems in the existing healthcare market, and whose troublesome
antics had been used by President Obama to galvanize support for reform.33
Notably, the federal government’s political response was not to counter
the “mandate” narrative, but rather to defend the mandate as essential to
addressing a compelling problem in a way that still preserves some choice.
The choice President Obama emphasized, though, was the ability to choose
among different plans in a new and improved individual insurance market.34
By contrast, having insurance was consistently and emphatically described
as a requirement of the new law. In light of his prior position and the
political and legal controversy the mandate generated, Obama could
certainly have soft-pedaled this description. The law contains a number of
exemptions, but Obama did not highlight these; rather he made clear that
those who can afford to buy insurance should and must do so. Obama also
could have used a phrase like “play or pay” to emphasize the choice people
would have between paying the assessment and buying insurance; but this
approach was apparently rejected in favor of the harsher mandate/penalty
rhetoric. In speeches and town halls, Obama repeatedly embraced the
mandate/penalty framework, using it to explain to the public how this new

31. See Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction & Brief in Support at 17-18, Thomas
More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 2:10-cv-11156 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 6, 2010).
32. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health
Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 632-33 (2010); Abigail R.
Moncrieff, Cost-Benefit Federalism: Reconciling Collective Action Federalism and Libertarian
Federalism in the Obamacare Litigation and Beyond, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 288, 288-91 (2012).
33. See Avik Roy, Once Upon a Time, Liberals Hated the Individual Mandate, FORBES
(Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/04/02/once-upon-a-time-liberalshated-the-individual-mandate/; Timothy Noah, Lefties Against Reform: A Taxonomy of LeftLiberal Opposition to the Health Care Bill, SLATE 2 (Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/prescriptions/2009/11/lefties_against_reform.html.
34. Obama stressed that this was not a “federal takeover” as asserted by opponents, but
rather a more robust federal regulatory scheme that would ensure a more functional private
market. Rather than creating a centralized financing scheme like Social Security, the
“mandate” was actually part of broader scheme to regulate private insurance companies to
create meaningful choice for individuals shopping in the individual insurance market.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

A MORAL MANDATE & THE MEANING OF CHOICE

277

system of shared responsibility was necessary to ensure affordable access for
everyone.35
This dominant mandate narrative shaped the focus of legal challenges
as well. The primary legal justification for enacting the coverage requirement
asserted by Congress in the legislation and by the Obama Administration in
court briefs was its power to regulate interstate commerce.36 The
government made clear that this requirement was part of a broader
regulatory scheme to regulate activity (the purchase and sale of insurance)
because of its financial impact on the interstate market, and typically
penalties used to enforce such regulatory mandates must be justified under
the commerce power.
The government’s characterization of the coverage requirement in its
legal defense of the ACA was more nuanced. In legal briefs, the federal
government argued that the coverage requirement alternatively could be
upheld as an exercise of Congress’s taxing power,37 but this assertion did
not take hold. For one thing, although the federal government was
responsible for crafting the mandate frame, opponents clearly preferred it to
the taxing choice alternative as a legal strategy. Opponents viewed a legal
challenge to the commerce power as a promising opportunity in light of
what some saw as a trend of narrowing federal power, especially by the
Rehnquist Court, and predictions that such narrowing would continue under
the Roberts Court.38 Opponents had good reason to be optimistic about
using the Tenth Amendment as a limit on the commerce power, as opposed
to the much broader tax and spend power, which was seen as incredibly
easy to satisfy and not subject to the same kind of Tenth Amendment
constraints.39 Moreover, because the mandate was characterized as

35. See, e.g., Barack Obama, Remarks on the United States Supreme Court Ruling on
the Affordable Care Act (June 28, 2012), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/w
s/?pid=101087; Barack Obama, Remarks at a Campaign Rally in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
(July 6, 2012), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=101330;
Future of Health Care Reform, CBS NEWS (July 15, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/video/
watch/?id=5162895n.
36. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591; see also 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2011).
37. Reply Brief for Petitioner (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 21-25, Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 748426.
38. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 89
(2001); Adam Winkler, Can They Kill Health Care in Court?, THE DAILY BEAST (Mar. 22, 2010),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/03/23/how-to-kill-health-care-in-court.html.
39. This concern has commonly been raised in the context of criticism that the Court has
not robustly applied Tenth Amendment limits on the federal government’s ability to establish
conditions on its spending power, at least until the Court’s Medicaid coercion holding in NFIB.
See Clark, supra note 5, at pt. II.B. But this concern has also been implicit in early debates
about the mandate in which challengers denied the viability of a taxing power claim, but
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“essential” to the other reforms in the ACA as part of the government’s
commerce argument, opponents believed that striking down the mandate
could be used to kill the entire Act or at least the private insurance
expansion.40
The commerce clause question quickly became the focal point for legal
scholars as well. Congress’ use of the commerce power to mandate citizens
to purchase a private good was viewed as “unprecedented” and as
presenting a novel and weighty constitutional question with significant
implications for the scope of the federal government’s power in other areas.
A split emerged among commentators and legal scholars41 on the
constitutionality of the mandate under the commerce power, generating
further controversy and leading to predictions that this would be the
determinative legal issue.
The trend among lower courts affirmed this focus: a split emerged on
the commerce clause issue,42 while the government’s taxing power claim
was universally viewed as a much weaker one. In fact, no lower court
upheld the mandate as an exercise of the taxing power.43 Lower courts that
addressed and rejected the taxing power justification seemed to view the
commerce and taxing theories as reflecting dichotomous conceptions of the
ACA’s coverage requirement: either the shared responsibility payment was a
“tax” that would be considered under the taxing power or it was a “penalty”
used to enforce a mandate that must be justified under the commerce
noted that even if it is used, it should be subject to the same Tenth Amendment limits enforced
on the commerce clause. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
40. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591-93.
41. See Mark Hall, Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 1825, 1827-29 (2011); see also Kevin Sack, Florida Suit Poses a Challenge to Health
Care Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/11/health/policy/
11lawsuit.html?pagewanted=all.
42. Compare Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 549 (6th Cir. 2011)
(upholding the mandate under the commerce power), abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566, with Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
648 F.3d 1235, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the individual mandate exceeded
Congress’ commerce power), aff’d in part, rev’d in part by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.
Ct. 2566.
43. See, e.g., Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 5-10 (D.C. Cir. 2011), abrogated by
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.,132 S. Ct. 2566 (applying a functional analysis to reject the “tax”
label for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act bar and only considering the constitutionality of
the mandate under the commerce power); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529,
539-40, 549 (6th Cir. 2011), abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566
(rejecting the “tax” label for purposes of the AIA bar and noting that there is no reason to
consider the taxing power justification for the mandate because it is a constitutional exercise of
the commerce power). In concurring opinions, Judges Sutton and Graham specifically
considered and rejected the taxing power theory as justification for the mandate. Thomas
More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d. at 550-54, 566.
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power.44 Only one court explicitly left open the possibility that the taxing
power argument was a viable one, but it did not consider the issue.45
One reason commonly given by courts for rejecting the taxing argument
was the government’s own framing of the coverage requirement as a
mandate enforced by a penalty. This was true, despite the fact that every
lower court considering the issue acknowledged that labels do not
necessarily control the constitutional question of whether something is a tax
or a penalty, and that courts should make an independent judgment to
determine whether a particular exaction functions more like a tax or penalty.
Lower courts seemed quite concerned about the fact that the ACA’s statutory
language and political framing sent a clear and consistent message that the
failure to buy insurance was unlawful and would be penalized, and so the
dominant framing clearly impacted lower courts’ attempts to look beyond
statutory labels.46 The trend among lower courts seemed to foreclose serious
consideration of the government’s attempt to provide an alternative

44. See Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Beginning with the district court in this case, all have found,
without exception, that the individual mandate operates as a regulatory penalty, not a tax.”).
45. The Fourth Circuit was the only court to find that the assessment could be
characterized as a tax, but this was for a different legal question: whether the challenge to the
coverage requirement was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA). See Liberty Univ., Inc. v.
Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 397-401 (4th Cir. 2011), abrogated by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.,
132 S. Ct. 2566 (vacating the judgment of the district court because it lacked jurisdiction to
decide the constitutionality of the act based on the AIA). The AIA bars suits seeking to restrain
the assessment or collection of a tax; taxpayers must first pay the assessment before they can
bring a suit to challenge its lawfulness. Determining whether an assessment qualifies as a “tax”
for purposes of the AIA bar is a matter of statutory interpretation, which is different from the
kind of functional analysis that courts use to determine whether or not a particular assessment
should be classified as a tax for constitutional purposes. The constitutional analysis is
discussed in greater detail in Parts III.C. and IV of this article. For a more in-depth
consideration of the difference between the AIA and the constitutional question, see Clark,
supra note 5, at pt. III.B.
46. See, e.g. Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648
F.3d at 1314 (“It is not surprising to us that all of the federal courts which have otherwise
reached sharply divergent conclusions on the constitutionality of the individual mandate, have
spoken with clarion uniformity [on the taxing power issue]”). The Eleventh Circuit goes on to
explain the relevance of the statutory label: “The plain language of the statute and well-settled
principles of statutory construction overwhelmingly establish that the individual mandate is not
a tax, but rather a penalty. The legislative history of the Act further supports this conclusion.”
Id. In responding to the government’s claims that the court should look beyond the label to
consider how the assessment operates in practice, the court explained why it came to the
same conclusion: “Even ignoring Congress’s deliberate choice of the term ‘penalty,’ the
individual mandate on its face imposes a monetary sanction on an individual who ‘fails to
meet the requirement’ to maintain ‘minimum essential coverage.’ As we see it, such an
exaction appears in every important respect to be ‘punishment for an unlawful act or
omission,’ which defines the very ‘concept of penalty.’” Id. at 1319 (citations omitted).
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justification based on the framing of the coverage requirement as a tax on
choice.
III. THE COUNTER NARRATIVE: TAXING “CHOICE”
On the surface, the dominant narrative seemed to assume that the tax
and commerce power theories presented competing and inconsistent
conceptions of the coverage provision, and that the mandate/penalty frame
was the correct one. A counter narrative was developing, however, that
showed the coverage provision could not be so easily classified.
A.

Policy Critique and the Reality of Choice

Many people desirous of reform were not satisfied with the compromise
in the ACA in light of the Administration’s purported goal of achieving
universal coverage. Critics attacked President Obama for never considering
the only option that would truly guarantee universal coverage –– a
Medicare-for-all type of system in which participation was truly compulsory
and healthcare financing was centralized.47 By contrast, the ACA preserves a
market-based system in which affordability, and thus access to insurance,
depends on a number of variables, including insurance company
participation, rate regulation, and individuals’ ability and willingness to
become health insurance consumers in this new system. Those familiar with
the problems of a fragmented healthcare market and the prior dysfunction
of the individual insurance market were skeptical about whether the
insurance reforms in the ACA would go far enough to realize its coverage
goals, and lack of adequate consumer participation was a serious
concern.48
The government’s own Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
that some people subject to the “mandate” would choose to pay the
assessment instead –– enough to yield approximately $4 million in revenue.
These estimates were consistent with assertions that the amount of the
47. See, e.g., J.D. Kleinke, The Conservative Case for Obamacare, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 29,
2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/opinion/sunday/why-obamacareis-a-conservativesdream.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (describing liberals’ disappointment
that Obama did not propose a single-payer plan, like Medicare-for-All, or include a public
option).
48. Id.; see also Abigail R. Moncrieff & Eric Lee, The Positive Case for Centralization in
Health Care Regulation: The Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20 KAN. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 266,
266 (2011); Alison Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented
Markets, and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 56 (2010) (describing the problems with
building reform on fragmented healthcare markets). I count myself among those supportive of
the ACA’s goal to expand coverage, but optimistically critical or cautiously optimistic about its
success, particularly because I believe that consumer participation is so essential and yet has
received remarkably little attention until relatively recently.
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“penalty” was too low to exert the kind of financial pressure that would
coerce people into purchasing insurance and that, as a result, people would
have a meaningful choice to not buy insurance. Setting such a low penalty
may seem confusing in light of Obama’s rhetorical stance about the need
for a mandate, but it is consistent with his original discomfort with a coercive
approach to reform –– recall that campaign-Obama believed such coercion
was unnecessary because of his confidence that people would make the
“right” choice.49
One reason the Administration’s enforcement approach was vulnerable
to criticism was because of a lack of discussion about the assumptions
underlying consumer participation as an essential piece of health reform.
Questions such as how people make these kinds of decisions, what tools
are most effective for influencing these decisions, and why or how much
influence the federal government expected the penalty to have on these
decisions were never answered.50 President Obama seemed to go back and
forth between believing a mandate was unnecessary and necessary, without
articulating the behavioral assumptions underlying his conclusions or the
government’s use of a penalty and the amount chosen. Although this
creates uncertainty about consumer participation in the new market and the
accuracy of CBO predictions, the fact that some people will exercise the
choice not to buy insurance under the ACA seems uncontroversial.
B.

Competing Legal Theories: Tax on Choice or Mandate with Penalty?

In addition to raising questions about the potential effectiveness of
health reform, the choice narrative was more consistent with the taxing
power justification that was not viewed as viable by courts and which did not
receive its due attention by the legal academy. Some scholars did recognize
this, asserting early on that the taxing power was the better justification for
the ACA because it was a more accurate interpretation of the ACA’s legal
design.51 Jack Balkin provided one of the earliest defenses of the law on

49. See Ezra Klein, Unpopular Mandate: Why do politicians reverse their positions?, THE
NEW YORKER (Jun. 25, 2012), available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/06/25/
120625fa_fact_klein.
50. Joshua Guetzkow, Beyond Deservingness: Congressional Discourse on Poverty, 19641996, 629 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 173, 176 (2010) (“In crafting legislative
solutions, policymakers employ not only diagnostic frames but also their notions about how to
bring about a desired behavior in the target population. To gain a better understanding of
policy development and choice, we therefore also need to understand the ways that
policymakers frame targets of policy and how this interacts with their [diagnostic framing of the
problem].”).
51. This section focuses on arguments developed by Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, and Robert
Cooter with Neil Siegel. But other scholars argued that the taxing power provided an
alternative justification for the coverage requirement as well. See, e.g., Brian D. Galle,
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taxing power grounds in a 2009 on-line debate about the constitutionality
of the mandate with attorneys David Rivkin and Lee Casey who opposed
reform.52 The debate was held after different versions of the ACA had
passed in the House and Senate, and before the language was finalized in
the reconciled version. Balkin began by asserting the taxing justification,
noting that the assessment was part of a broader framework that used
exactions and tax subsidies and credits to encourage the purchase of
insurance, as well as to raise revenue.53 Although Balkin began with the
taxing justification, the debate’s focus eventually turned to the commerce
clause because this is where his opponents focused their arguments.54
Rivkin and Casey initially did not address the taxing power justification
on its own merits; they relied heavily on the “mandate” label used in the
Senate version (as opposed to what they said “purports to be a tax
mechanism” in the House version), and they believed a mandate could only
be justified under the commerce power.55 In response to Balkin’s taxing
argument, however, they argued that even if the taxing power was a viable
alternative justification, it would nonetheless be subject to the same
constitutional limits as the commerce clause.56 In this way, Rivkin and Casey
essentially collapsed the taxing and commerce clause analyses, despite
contrary precedent that made clear that the taxing power is much broader
than the commerce power and not subject to the same kind of Tenth
Amendment limits. Rivkin and Casey also seemed to place greater
significance on the label than Balkin: Rivkin and Casey found the
elimination of the “tax” label from prior bills significant in deciding to treat

Conditional Taxation and the Constitutionality of Health Reform, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 27, 28
(2010).
52. See A Healthy Debate: The Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 93, 94 (2009) [hereinafter A Healthy Debate] (debate between David B. Rivkin, Jr. and
Lee A. Casey challenging the mandate, and Jack M. Balkin defending it).
53. Id. at 102.
54. Id. at 105 (“The arguments for Congress’s power to pass health insurance reform
under the General Welfare Clause are conclusive. However, because Rivkin and Casey devote
most of their discussion to the commerce power, I will discuss these issues as well.”).
55. Id. at 94-101, 109.
56. Id. at 100-01 (criticizing the view of the taxing power as a broader justification of the
“mandate” than the commerce power as an “inability to comprehend that the Constitution
inherently limits the reach of the Taxing and Spending Clause, just as it does the Commerce
Clause, and that exertions of congressional power that exceed the proper scope of these
clauses are void”). According to Rivkin and Casey, it does not matter if the “tax” used to
enforce the mandate would otherwise be a constitutional exercise of the taxing power; the fact
that the mandate exceeds the commerce clause means both are void. Id. at 100-01. They did
not seem to seriously consider the taxing justification on its own merits until their rebuttal of
Balkin, but then argued that as a tax, it would violate the Constitution’s prohibition on direct
taxes. Id. at 110.
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the challenged provision as a mandate that had to be justified under the
commerce power, while Balkin asserted that the coverage requirement could
be justified under both the commerce power and taxing power.57
Balkin affirmed this position in a 2010 article even after it was clear that
the ACA’s statutory language and political rhetoric adopted a
“mandate/penalty” framework.58 Although the primary goal of the article
was apparently to weigh in on what was already shaping up to be the
dominant narrative –– whether the mandate could be justified under the
commerce power –– Balkin could not ignore what seemed a more
compelling justification, noting briefly that the challenged provision is likely
“fully constitutional” under Congress’s taxing power because it is a tax that
“clearly promotes the general welfare under existing precedents.”59 He went
on to explain why he thought the taxing characterization was more
appropriate:
The [ACA] features an “individual mandate” that is designed to coax
uninsured persons into purchasing health insurance. The term . . . is
misleading for two reasons. First, the law does not actually require all
individuals to purchase insurance . . . . Second, it is not actually a mandate.
It is a tax, which people do not have to pay if they have purchased health
insurance . . . . The tax gives uninsured people a choice.60

Akhil Amar also provided a particularly robust analysis in favor of the
taxing power, by looking beyond the statutory label and focusing on the way
the exaction would function in practice.61 Like Balkin, Amar emphasized that
the ACA gives people a legally equivalent choice between two options ––
purchasing insurance and making the shared responsibility payment ––
which undermines the idea that the government is using the law to force
people to buy insurance.62 Amar acknowledged the ACA’s “regulatory” goal
to encourage the purchase of insurance, but explained that precedent
makes clear that taxes can serve a regulatory purpose as long as raising
revenue is also a goal.63
The problem with Balkin and Amar’s approaches, however, is that they
did not engage the obvious tension in the framing of the commerce and
57. A Healthy Debate, supra note 52, at 102-08.
58. See Jack Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 45 (2010).
59. Id. at 45.
60. Id. at 44-45 (emphasis added).
61. Akhil Amar, The Lawfulness of Health-Care Reform, YALE L.J. ONLINE 5-7, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856506. In fact, Amar has accused opponents of reform as the
ones playing word games by attributing greater meaning to use of labels than warranted.
Amar says this argument defies constitutional text, constitutional history, Supreme Court
precedent, and longstanding canons of interpretation. Id. at 8-12.
62. Id. at 5-12.
63. Id. at 13.
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taxing power arguments. They seemed to treat the taxing and commerce
theories as equally plausible for constitutional purposes without expressly
addressing the idea that the compulsory nature of the action (buying) that
must be justified under the commerce clause would seem to foreclose a taxbased theory that presumes that people are not coerced into action because
they have a genuine choice. This tension is implicitly suggested at different
points in their discussions. For example, Amar called the payment alternative
to the coverage requirement a “tax-penalty” a few times.64 He also said that
even if it does not qualify as a tax under a strict definition it should be
understood as a “tax-equivalent.”65 Similarly, Balkin used the terms
interchangeably in ways that suggest the provision defies easy classification:
It is likely that the individual mandate is fully constitutional under Congress’
power under the General Welfare Clause and the power “[t]o lay and
collect Taxes . . . .” Nevertheless, the tax is also constitutional as an exercise
of Congress’s commerce power.66

C. The Hybrid Nature of the ACA’s Coverage Requirement: Reconciling Tax
and Penalty Theories?
One of the only articles that addressed this apparent tension in a robust
way was written by Robert Cooter and Neil Siegel.67 Like Amar and Balkin,
Cooter and Siegel believed that the coverage requirement could be found
constitutional under either the commerce or taxing power theory.68 But in
Not the Power to Destroy, Cooter and Siegel considered the tension
presented by these alternative theories, and the implications for
constitutional analysis. They explained that the ACA is a kind of hybrid
exaction that defies easy classification, and that while such hybrids are not
exceptional they do present a greater challenge to judges to justify the
threshold classification that determines its constitutional treatment.69
Based on a review of the Court’s dense and somewhat inconsistent
precedent governing the tax-penalty distinction, Cooter and Siegel
developed a theory to explain the constitutionally relevant differences
between taxes and penalties which could be used to guide courts in
64. See, e.g., id. at 13 (“Apart from their Simon Says word game, Obamacare critics
have also argued that the insurance mandate cannot be upheld as a tax because the mandate
operate as an independent regulation from the tax-penalty.”).
65. Id. at 16-21.
66. Balkin, supra note 58, at 45 (emphasis added).
67. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of
the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195 (2012).
68. Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Taxes, Regulations, and Health Care: Part II of
Collective Action Federalism 14-15 (Sep. 20, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
University of Chicago Law School).
69. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1226-29, 1239-47.
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classifying hybrid exactions like the ACA’s. First, they emphasized that the
labeling is not and should not be determinative. Courts look beyond labels
to determine the proper classification and thus which constitutional test to
apply.70 In looking beyond the label, courts consider how a particular
exaction or assessment functions –– that is, what effect it will have on an
individual’s conduct.71 Penalties typically must be justified under a stronger
constitutional standard (like the commerce power), in part, because
penalties are coercive and prevent conduct; taxes, on the other hand, may
dampen conduct, but government takes as a given that such conduct will
continue so that taxing the behavior will generate some revenue. Thus
penalties and taxes have distinct effects that matter for constitutional
purposes.
Next, Cooter and Siegel identified three salient characteristics relevant to
courts’ classification of an exaction as either a tax or a penalty: whether the
amount or magnitude of the exaction is significant enough to undermine
choice or coerce someone into a decision; whether there is a mens rea
requirement (reflecting intentionality); and whether there is an escalative or
recidivist element to the exaction.72 They used these characteristics to
develop an “effects test” to determine when exactions should be treated as a
tax or penalty for constitutional purposes based on whether an exaction is
likely to prevent conduct (like a penalty) or merely dampen conduct (like a
tax). The easy cases –– that is cases in which something can be easily
classified as a tax or penalty –– are where all three of these characteristics
align: If none of the three are present, then it looks like a tax that merely
dampens conduct and is likely satisfied under the very broad tax and spend
power. If all three characteristics are present, then the exaction is likely to
prevent conduct, and thus should be treated like a penalty, which means it
will have to be justified under some other regulatory power, like the
commerce power. 73
Finally, Cooter and Siegel apply this test to the ACA coverage
requirement, acknowledging the challenge it presents as a “hybrid exaction”
with both tax and penalty characteristics. They note that the statutory
language in the ACA, which suggests that participation is mandatory and
that the failure to buy insurance is unlawful and will be penalized, creates
“expressive characteristics” that make the law look like a mandate enforced
by a penalty.74 But in applying the above three-pronged effects test, they

70. Id. at 1200-10.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1210-22.
73. Id. at 1222-35.
74. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1239-41 (emphasis added) (acknowledging that
Congress’ choice of label was “not arbitrary, thoughtless, or expressively interchangeable [but
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ultimately concluded that the “material effects” of the law will likely make it
function more like a tax: the magnitude of the exaction is too small to have
a coercive effect on people (based on CBO estimates); there is no scienter
requirement of the kind that suggests bad intent; and the amount of the
“penalty” does not increase with repeated failures to buy insurance.75 In
short, according to Cooter and Siegel, because one would not expect the
ACA to have the kind of punitive or coercive effect that one expects from
criminal or serious civil penalties, it should be treated like a tax for
constitutional purposes. Without much discussion, Cooter and Siegel
assume that the tax-like “material” effects will trump any penalty-like
“expressive” effects;76 that is, at most the law will have a dampening effect
by encouraging some people to buy insurance, but it will not compel
anyone to buy insurance.77
Against an overwhelming policy and legal narrative that focused on the
mandate and commerce power, Amar, Balkin, and Cooter and Siegel’s
attempts to refocus our attention on the taxing choice argument were
ultimately vindicated by the Supreme Court’s decision. It is not clear why this
“taxing choice” argument or the tension between the taxing choice and
mandate with penalty narratives did not get more attention prior to NFIB.
One reason could be that, as noted above, proponents and opponents
were effective at focusing everyone’s attention on the mandate in their
messaging. A government mandate creates a clear, and thus more
powerful, image of the challenged action, making it easier to stoke the fears
that animated mainstream discussion and fed into more sensational claims
of an unprecedented example of federal intrusion into personal
decisionmaking.
The taxing choice theory, on the other hand, is based on a more
nuanced consideration of the effect of the law, which, in turn, is based on
uncertain and complex behavioral predictions about how many people
would in fact choose to buy insurance and why. Although policy and legal
critiques consistently cite CBO estimates of people who would pay the
assessment to challenge the mandate rhetoric, this has not been very
successful as a descriptive tool. The reality of whether one will even be
rather] appears to reflect a congressional judgment that failing to insure is wrong. . . . [Thus]
[t]he minimum coverage provisions expresses a penalty”).
75. Id. at 1241-47.
76. See id. at 1247; see infra Parts III.B., IV.A. for a more in-depth discussion of Cooter
and Siegel’s assumptions underlying this conclusion.
77. As explored further in Part IV, infra, Cooter and Siegel’s article acknowledges the fact
that the expressive characteristics of the law that make it look like a penalty may have some
effect of their own, however the authors seem to easily dismiss its significance, concluding that
the material effects (suggesting a tax) trump any possible coercive or punitive effects of these
expressive characteristics. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1247.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

A MORAL MANDATE & THE MEANING OF CHOICE

287

subject to the mandate, whether one will be eligible for a subsidy and how
much, and what insurance will cost is based on technical, detailed, and
complex rules and calculations which cannot be performed yet because they
depend on other variables (such as insurance premiums and future income)
that may be unknown. Prior to the NFIB decision, as the law’s fate hung in
the balance, many were simply waiting to see if the law would survive before
investing the time to understand the details of implementation.
Finally, the taxing argument may also have not received as much
attention because far fewer legal scholars seemed willing to navigate the
confusing precedent on the tax-penalty distinction or the additional, and
relatively obscure, constitutional question raised by the taxing power ––
whether the ACA would violate the prohibition on direct taxes.78 The result
was that the taxing choice narrative did not receive the kind of airing it
deserved as a constitutional or policy matter.
IV. NFIB
Because of the dominant narrative described in Part II, many people
were caught by surprise when the Roberts Court in NFIB upheld the
mandate as an exercise of the taxing power, but not the commerce power.79
The taxing choice narrative was vindicated, but the Court’s reasoning
sparked criticism from both sides of the debate. Although the decision
brought closure with respect to the constitutional challenge, its reasoning
underscored the tension between the taxing choice and mandate narratives,
as well as the practical uncertainty created in the ACA with respect to the
role of consumer choice in the newly regulated private markets.

78. At various debates or panel discussions I observed or helped moderate, there were a
number of constitutional law scholars who said they did not feel as comfortable addressing the
taxing power questions so the commerce clause became the focus by default. Even the
majority in NFIB was criticized by the dissent for not giving this question adequate attention:
“[W]e must observe that rewriting § 5000A as a tax . . . would force us to confront a difficult
constitutional question: whether this is a direct tax that must be apportioned among the States
according to their population . . . . [T]he meaning of the Direct Tax Clause is famously
unclear, and its application here is a question of first impression that deserves more thoughtful
consideration than the lick-and-a-promise accorded by the Government and its supporters.
The Government’s opening brief did not even address the question . . . . And once
respondents raised the issue, the Government devoted a mere 21 lines of its reply brief to the
issue. At oral argument, the most prolonged statement about the issue was just over 50
words.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2655.
79. See Barnett, supra note 14; Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. Masha, Constitutional
Uncertainty and the Design of Social Insurance: Reflections on the ACA Case 1 (Columbia Law
Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 12-316, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/absstract=2146814.
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The Holding

With respect to the constitutionality of the individual coverage
requirement, the Court granted certiorari on the question of whether it could
be justified by Congress’ commerce or taxing power.80 Consistent with the
dominant focus pre-NFIB, most of the Court’s focus was on the commerce
clause issue. Writing for himself, Chief Justice Roberts considered this
argument first, holding that the coverage requirement exceeded the
commerce clause.81 Central to his analysis was the conception of the
mandate as compelling the purchase of insurance. He held that while the
regulation of the insurance market is undeniably authorized under the
commerce power, this power cannot be used to compel one to enter the
market or to create commerce where none existed before.82 Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito in a joint dissent,83 and Thomas in a separate
dissent,84 agreed with Roberts’ conclusion, echoing his concerns about an
expansive commerce power used to compel individuals to purchase private
goods. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
dissented from this part of the opinion; they believed it was constitutional
under the commerce power relying heavily on the government’s
characterization of the mandate as an essential part of the broader
regulatory scheme to fix the insurance market and solve the uninsurance
problem.85 All of the Justices, through four separate opinions, seemed to
embrace the framing of the challenged provision as a mandate, enforced by
a penalty; they simply differed as to whether or not it could be justified under
the commerce power.
Roberts then turned to the federal government’s alternative justification
under the taxing power.86 In a move which seemed to catch even his
colleagues by surprise,87 Roberts, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan, upheld the “mandate” on this basis.88 There were three notable
aspects of this part of Roberts’ opinion. First, Roberts, writing for himself
again, began by admitting that the government’s taxing power argument
presented a serious conceptual challenge to the Court:
80. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2577.
81. Id. at 2585-87 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
82. Id. at 2585-93 (focusing on the activity-inactivity distinction).
83. Id. at 2642 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
84. Id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
85. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2619-23.
86. Id. at 2595. The Constitution provides that Congress may “lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
87. See Paul Campos, Roberts Wrote Both Obamacare Opinions, SALON.COM (July 3,
2012), http://www.salon.com/2012/07/03/roberts_wrote_both_obamacare_opinions/.
88. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593-94.
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The Government’s tax power argument asks us to view that statute
differently than we did in considering its commerce power theory. In making
its Commerce Clause argument, the Government defended the mandate as
a regulation requiring individuals to purchase health insurance. The
Government does not claim that the taxing power allows Congress to issue
such a command. Instead, the Government asks us to read the mandate not
as ordering individuals to buy insurance, but rather as imposing a tax on
those who do not buy that product.89

Roberts’s unease with this alternative conception was palpable, as he
immediately conceded that the mandate/penalty conception was “the most
straightforward reading of the statute.”90
Although Roberts acknowledged the tension between these conceptions,
he did not try to explain which conception was the right or better one as a
constitutional matter. Roberts simply noted that statutes can have different
meanings and relied on a canon of interpretation that courts have a duty to
read a statute in the light that avoids it being found unconstitutional. As long
as the government’s alternative reading of the statute is a reasonable one,
the Court said, it has a “plain duty . . . to adopt [this reading if it] will save
the Act.”91 This meant that in order to answer the constitutional question
before it, the Supreme Court had to assess the reasonableness of the
government’s legal assertion that the shared responsibility payment could be
considered a tax, as opposed to a penalty.92
In considering whether the “tax” interpretation was reasonable, Roberts,
this time writing for the majority, refused to defer to Congress’ label.93 The
Court said that it must look beyond the label, and it applied a test similar to
the tests used by Amar, Balkin, and Cooter and Siegel, to determine whether
the payment effectively functioned more like a tax or a penalty.94 Under this

89. Id. at 2593.
90. Id. (noting the use of the word “shall” in I.R.C. §5000A(a) (2011)).
91. Id. at 2593-94 (“The question is not whether that is the most natural interpretation of
the mandate, but only whether it is a ‘fairly possible’ one.”).
92. This tax-penalty question was complicated by another claim asserted by the federal
government early in the litigation: that the legal challenge to the mandate was premature
under the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA). The AIA provides that “no suit for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any
person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.” I.R.C.
§7421(a) (2011). This means that individuals must pay their taxes before they can bring a suit
to challenge them, so the earliest that a taxpayer who failed to get insurance would have to
pay the “shared responsibility payment” is 2015. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582. The Court
unanimously held that the assessment was not a tax for purposes of the AIA bar, even though
a majority found that it could be justified as a constitutional tax. For a more in-depth
comparison of these two claims, see Clark, supra note 5, pt. III.B.
93. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (majority opinion).
94. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

290

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 6:267

functional test, the Court held that the payment looked like a tax in many
respects:
It is paid into the Treasury by “taxpayer[s]” when they file their tax returns; it
does not apply to individuals who do not pay federal income taxes because
their household income is less than the filing threshold in the Internal
Revenue Code; and for taxpayers who do owe the payment, its amount is
determined by such familiar factors as taxable income, number of
dependents, and joint filing status. Moreover, the requirement to pay is
found in the Internal Revenue Code and enforced by the IRS, which must
assess and collect it “in the same manner as taxes.” Finally, this process
yields the “essential feature of any tax” by producing at least some revenue
for the Government.” Indeed, the payment is expected to raise about $4
billion per year by 2017.95

Moreover, the Court found that the assessment does not have the usual
indices of a penalty for unlawful conduct. In distinguishing the ACA payment
from the kind of penalty typically subject to the stricter commerce clause test,
the Court looked at three things: the amount due, the absence of a scienter
requirement, and the means of enforcement. First, the Court found that
because for most Americans the amount due will be far less than the price
of insurance, this gives consumers a real choice between making the
payment to the government or buying insurance; the payment does not look
like a “prohibitory financial punishment” that is designed to force
compliance with the mandate.96 Second, the means of enforcement is solely
through collection by the IRS, and the ACA even prohibits the IRS from using
its harshest collection tools, such as liens, levies, and criminal prosecution.
Finally, the fact that there is no scienter requirement, coupled with the
government’s assurance that people who pay the tax are viewed as
complying with the law, suggests that the government is not really penalizing
uninsurance as wrongful behavior;97 rather it is using the shared
responsibility payment simply to encourage people to purchase insurance.
Roberts said that the tax on the failure to buy insurance is similar to other
regulatory measures upheld as taxes, such as taxes on cigarettes and
sawed-off shotguns.98 In acknowledging this regulatory goal, Roberts says
that this regulatory character does not undermine the government’s taxing
power argument.99
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2595-96.
97. Id.
98. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2596.
99. Id. (“Every tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it interposes an
economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed . . . . That
§5000A seeks to shape decisions about whether to buy health insurance does not mean that it
cannot be a valid exercise of the taxing power.”).
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Once Roberts determined that the taxing choice interpretation was
reasonable, it was easy to find the provision constitutional under the very
broad taxing power which simply requires that the tax raises revenue related
to the general welfare. The Court considered and rejected arguments that it
violated other Constitutional provisions, such as the Article I prohibition on
direct taxes.100
B.

The Dissent

Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito wrote a joint dissent that
was critical of this holding and particularly scathing about the Court’s
willingness to take the taxing power argument seriously. In fact, in framing
the overall case, they identify two questions that make the case difficult: the
first having to do with the constitutionality of the mandate under the
commerce power, and the second with whether the Medicaid expansion is
structured coercively in violation of the tax and spend power.101 They
ignored the taxing power justification altogether –– at least in this initial
framing –– suggesting that they did not even view it as a credible claim.
Indeed, after analyzing, and rejecting, the commerce power justification of
the mandate, the dissenting justices would have stopped there.102
The dissenting Justices then criticized the threshold assumption
underlying the government’s and majority’s suggestions that the payment
can be legitimately conceived as a penalty and tax at the same time, for
purposes of applying two different constitutional standards:
The Government contends, however, as expressed in the caption to Part II of
its brief, that “THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION IS INDEPENDENTLY
AUTHORIZED BY CONGRESS’S TAXING POWER.” The phrase
“independently authorized” suggests the existence of a creature never
hitherto seen in the United States Reports: A penalty for constitutional
purposes that is also a tax for constitutional purposes. In all our cases the
two are mutually exclusive. The provision challenged under the Constitution
is either a penalty or else a tax. Of course in many cases what was a
regulatory mandate enforced by a penalty could have been imposed as a
tax upon permissible action; or what was imposed as a tax upon permissible
action could have been a regulatory mandate enforced by a penalty. But we

100. Id. at 2598-2600 (holding that the payment did not violate the prohibition on direct
taxes in art. I, § 9, cl. 4 of the U. S. Constitution and was not subject to the same “activity
requirement” as the commerce power).
101. Id. at 2642-43 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
102. Id. at 2650.
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know of no case, and the Government cites none, in which the imposition
was, for constitutional purposes, both. The two are mutually exclusive.103

The joint dissenters insisted that precedent “establish[es] a clear line
between a tax and a penalty” where a tax is “an enforced contribution to
provide for the support of government” and a penalty is “an exaction
imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act.”104 They then argued
that the threshold question of whether the provision is a tax or penalty
should turn on the Government’s framing, and it was clear that the Act
adopted a framing of “wrongdoing” through its use of terms like “shall,”
“requirement,” and “penalty.”105 They also noted the President’s repeated
insistence to the public that the shared responsibility payment was a penalty,
and not a tax. The joint dissenters ultimately concluded that “there is simply
no way, ‘without doing violence to the fair meaning of the words used,’ to
escape what Congress enacted: a mandate that individuals maintain
minimum essential coverage, enforced by a penalty.”106
Although they clearly lost this legal argument, as the taxing power was
used to uphold reform, their view of the correct framing of the provision
seemed to prevail as the mandate/penalty narrative was the one that
seemed to resonate with the entire Court. Despite upholding the “mandate”
under the taxing power, the reasoning throughout the opinion reinforced the
notion that these were conflicting and incompatible narratives. This left
many unsatisfied with and confused by the majority opinion.107 Even those
who agreed with the conclusion lamented what seemed to be a lackluster
explanation for its holding.108 Indeed, Roberts’ reluctant and apologetic

103. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2650-51 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The dissent
admits that it can be “both [a tax and penalty] for statutory purposes since Congress can
define ‘tax’ and ‘penalty’ in its enactments any way it wishes.” Id. at 2651 n.5.
104. Id. at 2651(citing U.S. v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213,
224 (1996)). The dissent notes that “[i]n a few cases, this Court has held that a ‘tax’ imposed
upon private conduct was so onerous as to be in effect a penalty. But we have never held –
never – that a penalty imposed for violation of the law was so trivial as to be in effect a tax.
We have never held that any exaction imposed for violation of the law is an exercise of
Congress’ taxing power-even when the statute calls it a tax, much less when (as here) the
statute repeatedly calls it a penalty.” Id.
105. Id. at 2651-52.
106. Id. at 2651. The dissent relied on a different canon of statutory instruction to
challenge the majority’s willingness to view this as a tax: “[T]hat a statute that penalizes an act
makes it unlawful” Id. at 2652 (citing Powhatan Steamboat Co. v. Appomattox R. Co., 24
How. 247, 252 (1861)). The dissent also complained that “to say that the Individual Mandate
merely imposes a tax is not to interpret the statute but to rewrite it.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2655.
107. See Clark, supra note 5, at pt. V.A.2 (describing criticism of the Court’s decision).
108. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, A Bigger Victory Than We Knew, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug.
16, 2012 at 6, 12, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/aug/16/
bigger-victory-we-knew/.
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tone, as well as Ginsburg’s neglect of the issue in her partial concurrence,
suggests that not even a majority of the Court was fully persuaded by this
justification.109
The joint dissenters highlighted the majority’s failure to address the
conceptual disconnect between the commerce power and the taxing power
justifications,110 but the dissenting opinion was not very helpful for resolving
this tension either. For the dissent, this mandate-penalty frame negated all
other “functional” arguments used by the majority to conclude that the
taxing argument was a reasonable interpretation for constitutional purposes,
but the joint dissenters never explained why this was so. They merely
criticized the countervailing taxing theory as a “self-serving litigating
position[] entitled to no weight” in the face of a contradictory framing
created by the statutory language.111 But in light of a long history of the
Court prioritizing substance over form, the joint dissenters shirked their
obligation to explain why the mandate frame should trump the choice
architecture of the ACA. Neither the majority nor the dissent offered a
coherent theory for classifying hybrid exactions like the ACA’s coverage
requirement in a way that is consistent with the underlying concerns that
lead us to treat penalties and taxes differently for constitutional purposes.
C. Struggling to Reconcile Legal Choice with an Expressive Mandate
Cooter and Siegel’s theory begins to fill in this gap, helping to illuminate
the reason the Court struggles with these competing conceptions, and

109. Id.; see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593.
110. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2609-29 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discussing the mandate’s
constitutionality under the commerce clause only).
111. Id. at 2650-55. The dissenting Justices focused on what they considered potential
harms of the majority’s decision. First, they said that rewriting the statute to interpret the
provision as a tax lets the government avoid the political accountability for creating a tax. It is
not clear how this could be in this case since rules governing the origination of taxes in the
legislature do not seem to have been violated. Moreover, the idea that a mandate/penalty
frame would avoid the backlash that a taxing scheme or that the “play or pay” rhetoric would
have generated is not borne out by the controversy surrounding the mandate. See supra Part I.
The dissent also criticized the majority’s holding for letting the government elide the negative
constitutional implications that result from the most obvious constitutional question arising out
of the government’s own choice to frame this as a mandate/penalty. NFIB, 132 S. Ct at 2655.
But this simply begs the question about whether the provision was really a tax or penalty for
constitutional purposes. Finally, the dissent was disturbed by the majority’s decision on the
taxing power question in light of the Court’s unanimous holding that this was not a tax for AIA
purposes. It held that the AIA was inapplicable to the challenge because in the statutory
context, Congress’ choice to label the payment a “penalty” controls. The Court rejected the
“functional test” that was used for the constitutional analysis, leaving open the possibility that
the assessment could be viewed as a penalty for one purposes (the AIA statutory bar) and a
tax for another (the constitutional analysis). Id. at 2583 (citations omitted).
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offering a more robust justification for the majority’s conclusion. The Court’s
functionality analysis is very similar to Cooter and Siegel’s effects test. Both
focus primarily on the economic incentives for determining the likely “effect”
of the law on consumer behavior.112 Moreover, the “straightforward
reading” of the mandate referred to by the NFIB Court echoes what Cooter
and Siegel describe as the law’s “expressive” characteristic. Although Cooter
and Siegel do a better job of engaging the hybrid nature of the ACA and
the tension between legal choice and an expressive mandate, they do not
provide much discussion about the potential effects of these expressive
characteristics or about how to account for these effects in classifying an
exaction for constitutional law purposes.
Cooter and Siegel do touch on this briefly. Specifically, they address the
concern that these expressive characteristics will create penalty-like effects
that could make people feel compelled to buy insurance. These concerns
were raised by a judge on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Seven-Sky v.
Holder, one of the many cases challenging the constitutionality of the
coverage requirement prior to NFIB.113 In Seven-Sky,114 the court addressed
two issues relating to the characterization of the coverage requirement. The
one receiving the most attention was whether the provision was
constitutional under the commerce power; the court affirmed the district
court’s holding that it was a constitutional exercise of Congress’ commerce
power.115
The court also decided that it needed to address a threshold
jurisdictional question raised in an amicus brief about whether the challenge
was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA). This question had important
implications for whether the provision could be properly framed as a tax.
The D.C. Circuit, like all other courts deciding this issue except one, held
that the AIA did not apply because Congress deliberately chose to label the
shared responsibility payment a penalty, and not a tax, and Congress did

112. Cooter and Siegel actually developed and circulated this theory in draft prior to the
Court’s decision, however, the article was not formally completed and published until after
decision. There is some speculation about whether the Court was informed by their work, as
well as by other scholars like Amar and Balkin. See, e.g., Neil Siegel and Robert Cooter,
Online ACA Symposium – A Theory of the Tax Power That Justifies – and May Have Informed
the Chief Justice’s Analysis, SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 9, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/
07/online-aca-symposium-a-theory-of-the-tax-power-that-justifies-and-may-have-informedthe-chief-justices-analysis-2/.
113. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1246-47.
114. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F. 3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
115. Id. at 14-20. The coverage requirement was also challenged using the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, but this claim received almost no discussion. In a footnote, the court
briefly noted that it affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the appellants’ claim because they
failed to allege facts showing a substantial burden on their religious exercise. Id. at 5n.4.
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not include any language in the ACA expressing a contrary intent. Although
the test for determining whether something is classified as a “tax” for
purposes of the AIA is a matter of statutory interpretation, and thus is legally
distinct from the constitutional question, Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent on this
jurisdictional issue and his explanation for why it was premature to decide
the merits of the case, are relevant to understanding the choice/mandate
tension in the constitutional context.
Kavanaugh made clear that the government’s label would not be
determinative of the constitutional question; yet he did not dismiss the
relevance or significance of such labeling.116 Kavanaugh also made several
interesting analytical moves in his opinion that destabilized the notion that
the coverage requirement could be easily classified as a tax or penalty, even
under a functional analysis. The first interesting move he made was to use a
hybrid label throughout his dissent, which he sets out right at the beginning:
One provision of the [ACA] requires most Americans to maintain health
insurance or else pay a tax penalty when they file their annual tax returns.
That provision — commonly referred to as the individual mandate — is
codified in the Tax Code and takes effect in 2014. The tax penalty for those
without health insurance is capped at the average price of a health
insurance plan. The tax penalty is the only sanction for failing to have health
insurance. And the IRS — and only the IRS — may assess, collect, and
enforce the tax penalty.”117

The second interesting move was his criticism of the majority’s “heavy
rhetorical reliance on the fact that Congress labeled the individual mandate
provision as a ‘penalty’ and not a ‘tax.’”118 In explaining why courts should
not rely so heavily on rhetorical labels, Kavanaugh describes Congress’
possible motivation for choosing a penalty label that suggests the label may
indeed have an important behavioral effect that goes beyond mere rhetoric.
Specifically, he notes that Congress may choose the label “penalty” instead
of “tax” because the “penalty” label suggests violation of a legal rule, which
government believes will have a more powerful effect in altering behavior
that Congress wants to encourage or discourage.119
In fact, Kavanaugh cites to government reports which reveal how the
federal government has used this strategy in other contexts. For example, he
cites to a 1999 report by the Department of the Treasury which says that

116. In my opinion, Cooter and Siegel read too much into Kavanaugh’s footnote by using
it to characterize Kavanaugh’s position as “deem[ing] it constitutionally irrelevant that the ACA
labeled the exaction for noninsurance a ‘penalty’ instead of a ‘tax.’” Cooter & Siegel, supra
note 67, at 1244 (emphasis added).
117. Seven-Sky, 661 F. 3d at 21 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 29.
119. Id. at 29-30.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

296

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 6:267

“[p]enalties clearly signal that noncompliance is not acceptable behavior . .
. . In establishing social norms and expectations, subjecting the
noncompliant behavior to any penalty may be as important as the exact
level of the penalty . . . .”120 He cites to another report as early as 1989 in
which an Executive Task Force for the commissioner’s Penalty Study asserted
that “[p]enalties as a consequence of violating a standard of behavior
remind taxpayers of their duty” and that “[p]enalties are a tool for
change.”121 If such assumptions are true, then labeling would seem to be
relevant to any constitutional test that turns on an exaction’s predicted
effects (like Cooter and Siegel’s) or an inquiry into how it actually functions
(like the Court’s in NFIB). And this is where Kavanaugh ultimately ends up
when, toward the end of his dissent, he speculates –– but does not draw any
conclusions — about how a court would answer the threshold constitutional
question of whether the ACA coverage requirement should be analyzed as a
tax or penalty.
Kavanaugh seems genuinely uncertain about the effect that such
labeling might have on this constitutional question. This is difficult because
of contradictory assertions –– both of which Kavanaugh seems to take
seriously. Those supporting the taxing choice theory point to the low penalty
amount and CBO estimates of the people who will choose to pay the
assessment, though Kavanaugh questions the assumptions upon which this
“choice” theory is based:
Such an argument assumes that citizens care only about economic
incentives and not also about complying with The Law. Plaintiffs vigorously
contest that assertion. According to plaintiffs, the United States does not
necessarily consist of 310 million people who have over-absorbed their
Posner and equate (i) a traditional regulatory tax that incentivizes or
disincentivizes certain behavior and (ii) a legal mandate or prohibition
accompanied by a tax penalty of the same amount. After all, plaintiffs say,
common sense tells us that many citizens want to be law-abiding (and
known as law-abiding), and that their desire to be law-abiding affects their
behavior.122

Kavanaugh never tells us how to resolve this dilemma because he feels it is
premature. He suggests a potentially easy fix that might make the question
disappear: if the “penalty” label is changed to a “tax” one then the
government is sending a singular message that should make classification

120. Id. at 30 n.11 (citing to Office of Tax Policy, Dep’t of the Treasury, Report to the
Congress on Penalty and Interest Provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 36 (1999))
(emphasis added).
121. Id. (citing to the Exec. Task Force for the Commissioner’s Penalty Study, Report on
Civil Tax Penalties at III-1 & X-1 (1989)).
122. Seven-Sky, 631 F.3d at 49.
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easy. If not, the juxtaposition of legal choice and an expressive mandate
complicates the constitutional question because the proper constitutional
framework depends in part on behavioral predictions and assumptions that
have either been ignored, not well supported or explained, or appear to be
inconsistent.
It is this discussion to which Cooter and Siegel refer as they consider
whether the economic or “material” effects of the ACA trump its “expressive”
characteristics. Unfortunately, Cooter and Siegel’s discussion of the
potential expressive function of law is not very helpful in this regard. Cooter
and Siegel dismiss these expressive law concerns and their relevance to
constitutional analysis too quickly.123 They make the same mistake that
Kavanaugh identified in the government’s argument: they conclude that the
material effects (consistent with a tax) trump the expressive effects (consistent
with a penalty) based on an assumption that “most people care more about
their private costs than social costs” and that “most people respond by
comparing the exaction to their private benefit for the conduct.”124
According to the authors, private costs, defined primarily in economic terms,
are considered paramount in predicting consumer behavior under the ACA,
which seems to assume that people are hyper-rationalized, profitmaximizing actors.125
V. UNDERSTANDING THE EXPRESSIVE VALUE OF LAW
NFIB, Cooter and Siegel’s article, and Judge Kavanaugh’s decision, all
call attention to the expressive function of the ACA, and its role in
complicating our understanding of the ACA for constitutional purposes and
for predicting reform success. Still missing though is a useful explanation for
exactly how and why this expressive function could matter. What
assumptions about the expressive effects of the ACA have led to such
different and heated conclusions about whether a taxing choice or mandate
with penalty conception is the right one? Can a closer look at the
assumptions that underlie the classification of a hybrid like the ACA
123. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1230-36, 1246-47 (“In sum, the ACA’s
exaction for noninsurance is mixed because it has a penalty’s expression and a tax’s
materiality [but] [b]ecause the predicted effect of the ACA’s exaction for noninsurance is to
dampen uninsured behavior, not to prevent it, it is a tax equivalent for purposes of Congress’
tax power.”). Cooter and Siegel note later, however, that although the effects may not be able
to be predicted with certainty, it is not a court’s job to make this prediction. It is enough that
the Court finds that Congress could have rationally concluded that an exaction would dampen
conduct instead of prevent it. Id. at 1233.
124. Id. at 1231-32 n.165.
125. Id. (“Whether a tax or penalty should be used to regulate behavior depends on
whether the amount is enough to cause people to internalize the social cost created by certain
conduct.”).
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coverage provision provide a more satisfying and coherent defense of
Roberts’ approach? What might these assumptions mean for the success of
reform? If the ACA’s expressive effects are so easily trumped by its material
effects, then will enough people buy insurance and participate in the market
to ensure affordable coverage? The remainder of the Article will explore
these questions, beginning with an overview of law’s expressive function and
theories about how this can influence behavior.
A.

Expressive Law Theory as a Critique of Law and Economics

Expressive law theorists understand the expressive characteristics,
dimensions, or functions of law to mean the “cultural consequences of
choice –– [] the values that a particular policy choice, in the specific context
in which it is taken, will be generally understood to endorse.”126 This is
important because their central claim is that law has an expressive influence
on behavior independent of any effect created by its sanctions; that is, law
affects behavior expressively by what it says rather than by what it does.127
Expressive law theories are, in part, a critique on the traditional law and
economics approach, which focused exclusively, or primarily, on individuals
as rational actors driven to maximize economic benefit.
Although not fully developed, we see hints of this traditional approach in
Cooter and Siegel’s focus on the “material” effects of the assessment based
on the amount, and their dismissal of the significance of possible expressive
effects of the law to influence behavior. Underlying their assertion that
“people care more about their private costs than social costs”128 are implicit
assumptions that private costs and benefits are understood primarily in
economic terms, and that private and social costs are easily distinguished.
NFIB implicitly adopts this approach by focusing only on the sanctions and
character of enforcement to determine whether the financial costs of
uninsurance were significant enough to essentially leave one no choice but
to buy insurance.
The problem, expressive law theorists say, is that this traditional
approach fails to account for the way that social norms, and the stigma or
esteem that results from rejecting or complying with such norms, can
influence people’s behavior independently of other sanctions or
enforcement threats. For instance, Lawrence Lessig has criticized the legal
profession for ignoring the way governments “act to construct the social

126. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 66 (1995).
127. See id. at 66-71; see generally Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of
Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of
Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2031-32 (1996).
128. Cooter & Siegal, supra note 67, at 1232 n.165.
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structures, or social norms, or . . . the social meanings that surround us,”
despite the fact that this idea is well understood in social theory.129 Cass
Sunstein and Richard Pildes have mounted similar criticisms, noting that
“[s]ometimes people do not behave as economists predict –– deviating in
ways that do not appear to maximize their ‘expected utility’ often because of
social norms . . . . Costs and benefits include the consequences of acting
inconsistently or consistently with social norms.”130 Sunstein offers an
example of rational decision-making that accounts for the role of social
norms:
[C]hoice is, roughly speaking, a function of the intrinsic utility of choice, the
reputational utility of choice, and the effects of choice on a person’s selfconception. If someone cleans up after his dog, or fails to do so, his
decision may reflect not only the act’s intrinsic value, but also anticipate
reputational effects as well as effects on the agent’s self-esteem. We can
thus extend the game theoretic insight that a person’s behavior often
depends on expectations about behavior by other people. Behavior and
choice are a product not only of other people’s behavior, but also of the
perceived judgments of other people, and those judgments have a great
deal to do with –– indeed they constitute –– social norms. People act in
accordance with their perceptions of what other people think. Sometimes
they act strategically in order to avoid other people’s opprobrium. It follows
that individual rationality and self-interest are a function of social norms and
are not sensibly opposed to them.131

Though government can use its expressive power in conjunction with
robust enforcement and punitive sanctions to coerce people into complying
with the law, the more interesting case to expressive law theorists, and the
more relevant one for purposes of considering the ACA mandate, is how
government can use its expressive power to influence behavior in the
absence of meaningful enforcement or sanctions. This power has received
the most attention in the areas of antidiscrimination and criminal law, but
government’s ability to harness this power in the regulatory arena should not
be underestimated. Sunstein has shown that the expressive goal of much
regulation is to “reconstruct existing norms and to change the social
meaning of action through a legal expression or statement about

129. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 947, 956
(1995).
130. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909-10
(1996); see also Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 126, at 66 (noting that the weakness with costbenefit approaches is that “they necessarily focus on the quantitative or material effects of
policies [and] cannot take into account [] the expressive dimensions of legal and political
choices”).
131. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 127, at 2022, 2031-32.
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appropriate behavior.”132 It is generally accepted as legitimate and standard
for government to use its expressive power to counter existing norms that
may be harmful or an impediment to well-being, especially where the harm
is a collective one that demands some kind of intervention or coordination
by a third party –– like the government.133 This is particularly visible in the
areas of public health and safety.134 But scholars have also demonstrated
how government and powerful industry players in the financial arena have
successfully leveraged the expressive power of law and social norms to
influence people’s financial decisions, especially as it concerns debt.135
Evidence of the government’s expressive power in both of these
regulatory arenas — health and safety, on the one hand, and financial
regulation, on the other, may have significant implications for the
government’s ability to implement health reform successfully. Affordable
coverage is critical for healthcare access, but affordable coverage is only
possible if enough people become consumers in the individual market. And
as already noted in the first three sections, the ACA’s regulatory structure
does not actually create a true legal mandate for consumers to buy
insurance, nor is the economic penalty viewed by most people as high
enough to influence people as a purely economic matter. But if the
government has already successfully leveraged its expressive power in the
health, safety, and financial arenas, it might be able to do the same in order
to solve a serious collective action problem with important health and
financial dimensions. Before exploring this specific claim, it is necessary to
flesh out exactly how and why law may have an expressive influence in some
cases.
B.

How Does Law Expressively Influence Behavior?

Scholars’ claims about the influence of expressive law in any given case
are subject to debate, in part because of uncertainty about exactly how law
expressively influences the behavior of any one individual. A full exploration
of the merits and weaknesses of the types of studies used to support
expressive law theories is beyond the scope of the article, but even
expressive law theorists acknowledge that it is difficult to establish clear

132. Id. at 2031; see also Lessig, supra note 129, at 956 (“If social meanings exist, they
are also used. They not only constitute, or guide, or constrain; they are also tools - means to a
chosen end whether an individually or collectively chosen end. They are a resource - a
semiotic resource - that society provides to all if it provides to any. They are a way ‘for hitting
each other and coercing one another to conform to something [one has] in mind’; or for
inspiring another or inducing another to do, or believe, or want, in a certain way.”).
133. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, supra note 130, at 967.
134. See id. at 910.
135. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

A MORAL MANDATE & THE MEANING OF CHOICE

301

causal relationships between a law’s expressive value and one’s behavior.
This could explain why courts were reluctant to do a meaningful inquiry into
the potential punitive expressive effects of the ACA for constitutional
purposes. As imperfect as a law and economics approach may be, it has
some predictive power and is more consistent with the taxing choice theory
adopted by the Court in NFIB. That said, scholars have offered explanations
for the different ways that government can expressively influence people’s
behavior, which are useful for understanding how the ACA may impact
people’s choice to buy insurance.
Law may impact decision-making in the absence of the threat of legal or
significant economic sanction in different ways. For example, the expressive
message of a law may reflect existing social norms, such that violation of
these norms invites stigma or shame. Law can also be used deliberately to
try to change or redefine the social meaning of behavior by altering the
social “cost” of that behavior, in ways that impact people’s choices. These
kinds of effects presume three things. First, as noted above, they presume
that the perceived judgments of other people matter and that people will act
in accordance with what others think.136 Second, they depend on the
behavior being easily visible, so that one who violates the norm is
vulnerable to stigma or reputational harm.137 Finally, there is a presumption
that the law reflects social norms: people motivated by a desire to seek
approval or avoid disapproval consider the social consequences of acting
inconsistently or consistently with norms established by the law.138
One common illustration of this phenomenon occurs in the context of
laws requiring people to clean up after their dogs. Sunstein explains how
such law might expressively influence people to comply despite the absence
of meaningful enforcement:
Consider, for example, laws that forbid littering and laws that require people
to clean up after their dogs. In many localities such laws are rarely enforced
through the criminal law, but they have an important effect in signaling
appropriate behavior and in inculcating the expectation of social
opprobrium and, hence, shame in those who deviate from the announced
norm. With or without enforcement activity, such laws can help reconstruct
norms and the social meaning of action. Someone who fails to clean up
after his dog may then be showing disrespect or even contempt for others.
Many, most, or all people may see things this way, and the result can be
large changes in behavior. Eventually there can be norm cascades, as
136. Sunstein, supra note 127, at 2032; see also McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of
Expressive Law, supra note 127, at 340.
137. Lessig, supra note 129, at 1015.
138. See McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, supra note 127, at 340. This
reflects an assumption that democratically-produced legislative outcomes are positively
correlated with popular attitudes and signal of these attitudes. Id.
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reputational incentives shift behavior in new directions. It should be
unsurprising to find that, in many places, people clean up after their dogs
even though this is not especially pleasant and even though the laws are
rarely enforced.139

A more powerful and relevant example of this expressive power occurs
in the case of underwater mortgages and the concern about people walking
away from their mortgages. In his paper titled Underwater and Not Walking
Away: Shame Fear and the Social Management of the Housing Crisis, Brent
White explores the reasons why the vast majority of underwater homeowners
continue to make their mortgage payments, even when it is clearly not in
their best financial interest to do so.140 White argues that, in some cases,
homeowners “ignore market and legal norms under which strategic default
might not only be a viable option, but also the wisest financial decision
[because] they have been encouraged to behave in accordance with social
and moral norms that require individuals to keep their promises and honor
financial obligations.”141 White traces how the government, financial
industry, and other “social control agents” cultivated these norms causing
homeowners to associate foreclosure with fear, shame, and guilt, and how
homeowners’ desire to avoid shame is what drives many people to continue
paying their mortgage, even when they know it is against their financial
interest.142 White’s example shows how government can successfully
leverage its expressive power to shape or create social meaning and norms
that can overcome compelling countervailing factors and interests to
influence behavior. This is likely due, in part, to the fact that the foreclosure
process itself provides multiple opportunities for government and private
actors to bombard underwater homeowners with shaming messages, as well
as the fact that even after the foreclosure, the effect of a foreclosure on
one’s credit report ensures that the decision to walk away, and thus the

139. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 127, at 2032-33.
140. Brent T. White, Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame Fear and the Social
Management of the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971, 971-72 (2010) (noting that
many of these homeowners are “hundreds of thousands of dollars underwater and have no
reasonable prospect of recouping their losses”, and noting that this “includes [] homeowners
who live in ‘nonrecourse states’ [] where lenders cannot pursue defaulting homeowners for a
deficiency judgment.”). White acknowledges behavioral economists’ arguments that some of
these homeowners may suffer from cognitive biases that make it difficult to understand
whether they would in fact be better off if they walked away. He claims that this fails to explain
the cases where homeowners are aware that it would be in their best financial interest to walk
away, but nonetheless make an apparently irrational financial decision to keep paying. Id. at
972.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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stigma associated with it, would continue to be visible to others in the
future.143
An external threat of shame or promise of esteem (the “reputational
utility of choice”) may not necessarily be the motivating factor or cost in any
particular individual’s decision. Certainly threat of reputational harm may
play a more important role where law is being used to actively change an
existing norm that is strongly preferred by individuals. But in the absence of
such a strong contrary preference, some individuals may be motivated to
change their behavior by a strong internal sense of fairness to follow the
norms established or reflected by the law.144 In these cases, the visibility of
the behavior or opportunity for shaming becomes less relevant for
compliance, as long as the law’s message is communicated clearly and
consistently.
In some cases, law may create or change norms “by signaling the
underlying attitudes of a community or society.”145 In this way, the law can
make visible a social meaning that may have been “hidden” previously,
which facilitates the realization of a behavioral norm that is more consistent
with people’s preferences by making it easier for people to engage in the
desirable behavior, or to stop the undesirable behavior. This might happen
in a couple of ways. It could be that the law, by affirming existing attitudes
of a “silent majority” in a visible and expressively forceful way, empowers
this majority to become more vocal and exert social pressure on those who
violate legal norms. Take public smoking bans as an example. Even without
the threat of legal compliance, nonsmokers (and even occasional smokers
who find they like the idea of a ban in certain settings) may feel entitled to
“enforce” the law through social sanctions — confrontation and shaming of
those who violate the law. This confrontation and shaming creates a social
cost to the act of smoking in violation of the ban, which may be significant
enough to alter the smoker’s behavior. The greater the pressure, and the
more widespread the use of social sanctions become, the more people’s
beliefs shift to embrace a smoke-free environment as the new behavioral
norm.
Alternatively, the law may help change social norms by ambiguating the
meaning attached to particular behavior. Take laws requiring motorcycle
helmets for example. If people are given a choice to wear helmets or not,
then the community of riders may assign their own social meaning to the
choice, which can impact people’s decisions. Riding without a helmet may
signal a valuing of freedom, the willingness to take risks, or even a belief
143. Id. at 996-1007.
144. See McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, supra note 127, at 344-45
nn. 12-17.
145. Id. at 340.
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about what it means to get an “authentic” riding experience.146 This can be
used deliberately to, or can inadvertently, create a stigma that attaches to
those who choose to wear a helmet. The extent to which one’s reputational
utility is harmed by wearing a helmet, many people will likely choose to ride
without to avoid the stigma, even if they would prefer to wear one or would
otherwise be indifferent. But when law requires helmets, it ambiguates the
meaning of choosing to wear one: Is it that someone is not daring and free
enough, or is it just that they want to avoid getting an expensive ticket? In
this way, law can undermine prior stigmatizing messages that were
impediments to people choosing to act in ways they may prefer and that is
certainly more desirable from the government’s perspective.
Relatedly, law can serve an educative function that helps illuminate a
norm that was previously invisible or suppressed due to a lack of
information.147 The expressive messaging of law can be used to update
people’s existing beliefs about the costs and benefits of a particular action
(such as the health risks of smoking or the danger of not wearing a seat
belt) that leads people to change their behavior (stop smoking or buckle up)
in ways that are more consistent with their own desire for health and
safety.148 Thus in promoting or defending such laws, the government gives
people new information about a risk or problem, which leads them to act in
ways that are more consistent with their preexisting value of health and
safety, and which, in turn, leads to the kind of behavior the government
wants to promote.
Finally, the moral meaning and stigma attached to a violation is likely a
function of the degree and type of harm one is understood to be causing. If
second-hand smoke is simply unpleasant, a violator may be stigmatized as
rude. But once people understand that smoke also increases one’s risk of
serious health problems, violators may be viewed much more harshly, as

146. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 129, at 964 & n.54 (mentioning the struggle around the
social meaning of helmets and attempts to increase their use in the United States). Lessig
provides a much richer discussion of two other examples of helmets and social meaning. His
first example looks at how the changing political meaning of helmets in Russia was shaped by
government in ways that first discouraged and then encouraged their use. Id. at 963-65. His
second example focuses on the use of helmets in hockey and is more directly analogous to my
discussion of how rules or law can be used to change the meaning of wearing motorcycle
helmets in the U.S. to encourage use. Id. at 967-68.
147. Id.; see also McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, supra note 127, at
340 (noting that individuals are sensitive to new information); Sunstein, Social Norms and
Social Roles, supra note 130, at 913-14 (“There is a thin line between education and
provision of information on the one hand and attempted norm-change on the other. [I]n the
process of norm management, government has a number of tools.”).
148. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, supra note 130, at 948-49; Alex Geisenger,
A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 53-55 (2002).
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showing contempt for others and thus deserving of contempt in return. This
knowledge may then influence the frequency and intensity with which
nonsmokers are willing to confront violators, which in turn, raises the
reputational harm and thus the social cost of violating such bans.149 In this
way, increased knowledge about the risks of smoking may also create
greater awareness and sensitivity in smokers because of their own internal
sense of fairness and value of health, which causes them to change their
behavior –– to embrace rules that limit smoking and even to try to quit.
Expressive law theory provides a very rich picture of the many ways in
which law can influence people’s choices in the absence of legal or serious
economic sanction. Unfortunately, this richness also limits its predictive
power because any one, or more likely some combination, of these theories
may be operating in any given instance to influence an individual’s behavior
based on his or her own internal norms, how visible social norms are, and
one’s sensitivity and exposure to external shaming based on these social
norms.
C. The Strength of Government Messaging and Expressive Power
Taking a closer look at the different ways in which law may influence
behavior in the above examples should make clear that merely passing a
law or making a pronouncement does not magically and instantly transform
social meaning. Expressive law scholars recognize that the influence may be
direct or indirect, and may occur over time by gradually shifting the
equilibrium to a point where the desired behavior increases and a greater
portion of the public has internalized this as the new norm.150 Whether the
public internalizes certain norms and how quickly norms shift depend on a
number of factors, such as the visibility of the message, the credibility of the
source of the information, and the consistency and clarity of the message;
these factors, in turn, determine law’s expressive power.
Generally, government has a huge advantage in shaping social
meaning, in part because the uniqueness and emphatic means of
government speech helps to guarantee a minimal level of credibility and
sincerity that demands the public’s attention. Law also guarantees a
powerful forum for publicizing the new norm. The ACA is a perfect example
of this as it has received overwhelming attention in the mainstream media.
President Obama’s use of the bully pulpit to tout and explain healthcare
reform repeatedly, as well as the Administration’s use of its websites to
highlight the benefits of reform and to generate anticipation for enrollment
149. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Keynote: Three Effects of Social Norms on Law:
Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2000) (explaining this
phenomenon in the context of owners picking up after their dogs).
150. See, e.g., Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, supra note 130, at 928-30.
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in 2014, are examples of the powerful tools available to government
speakers.151 Moreover, the government’s presumption of credibility in
messaging and in predictions about behavior are illustrated by scholars and
judges’ reliance on CBO statistics estimating the amount of revenue the
ACA penalty will generate based on predictions of the number of consumers
who will forego buying insurance despite being subject to the mandate.
Clarity of message will be a big challenge, however, because of the
law’s complexity. This complexity has made it easy for opponents to feed
voters wrong information, such as the creation of death panels, which fuels
public fear and opposition. Where government is trying to solve a multifaceted collective action problem, such as the healthcare access/cost
problem that requires facilitating coordination between many different public
and private actors, it may require a massive technical, detailed, and
complex regulatory scheme that can seem impenetrable to consumers,
making it difficult to construct a clear, consistent and powerful expressive
message.152
Trust is also a critical factor in determining whether consumers embrace
the ACA’s moral messaging. In an environment where issues are highly
politicized and public mistrust of the public or private actors delivering the
message is salient, the expressive characteristics of law may not have as
much moral or practical force for everyone. Such polarization has certainly
characterized the health reform debate, but this polarization was largely
fueled by legal challenges to the law that have been settled, and the heated
rhetoric is starting to die down.
One complicating factor is that while the federal government is the
creator of the ACA and has been its key promoter so far, states will have to
play a key role, and trust is generally greater the closer the public is to the
lawmakers delivering the message. In states that are embracing reform and
acting in partnership with the federal government, this can strengthen the
credibility and force of the federal government’s message. In states that are
resisting health reform, or only proceeding in a grudging way, the message
will likely get diluted or overwhelmed by contradictory messages from
officials who are vocal opponents of reform and closer to the people that
the federal government needs to reach.

151. See, e.g., The Healthcare Law & You, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/
law/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2013); see also Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/healthreform/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
152. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1649, 1683-87 (2000) (describing the important signaling and coordinating functions of
legal and social norms); Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 127
(describing the role of norms in solving collective action problems).
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Another variable is the role of consumer groups and public interest
organizations. Groups advocating for greater healthcare access are playing
a key role in providing consumers information about reform generally and
specifically about enrollment through the exchanges. These consumer
organizations are already trusted by certain constituencies, and to the extent
the government is able to elicit help from these trusted private partners, this
can give its message greater force and credibility. On the other hand,
organizations mobilized against reform continue to use legal and social
action to undermine reform efforts with their constituencies as well.
Although there are many variables that impact the government’s ability
to craft and publicize its message effectively, the federal government has
successfully leveraged its expressive power before, and a close look at its
reform rhetoric suggests its intent to do this again to try to ensure adequate
participation in the new private insurance expansion. Although expressive
law theories do not have predictive power, they do provide a framework for
thinking about how the ACA could expressively encourage consumer
participation in the new market despite legal choice and weak economic
sanctions. The final part of this Article explores this by analyzing the
expressive messages of the health reform law, existing norms that the ACA is
trying to change, and the potential effects on certain groups of the
uninsured, including the “young and healthy,” those deemed higher risk,
and those adamantly opposed to the ACA.
D. The Expressive Force of Penalties Versus Taxes
Before exploring this potential expressive effect, one might wonder about
the importance of an expressive “mandate” as opposed to a “tax” label in
light of the obvious regulatory character of the shared responsibility
payment. Expressive law scholars note that when the government decides to
tax or subsidize an action, this is another way of constructing social
meaning. Regardless of whether an assessment is labeled as a tax or a
penalty, does this not send a clear message that buying insurance is the
desirable action?
A number of people have questioned the effectiveness of taxes as a
regulatory tool. In a recent paper on Taxation as Regulation, Tax Law
Scholar Reuven Avi-Yonah says that while regulation may be a legitimate
goal of taxation in some cases, it can not effectively serve that function for
the ACA.153 Avi-Yonah gives two reasons for this. First, as a policy matter,
the “health care tax,” as he calls it, is relatively complex, has difficult rules
153. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Taxation as Regulation: Carbon Tax, Health Care Tax, Bank Tax
and Other Regulatory Taxes 2-3 (U. Michigan Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-020, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract+210
2426.
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defining when it even applies, and disproportionately impacts the poor.154
Second, he says that calling it a tax “may dilute its effect because people
tend to have a different reaction to not paying taxes than to avoiding
penalties.”155 In other words, it does not convey a clear, strong social norm
about the importance of buying health insurance or to whom the obligation
attaches.
Health law scholar John Blum offers an even more troubling critique of
the problem with government’s uses of “sin taxes” to perform a regulatory
function. In his article, Sin Tax, Forgiveness and Public Health Governance,
Blum focuses on traditional sin taxes like taxes on alcohol and tobacco,
highlighting the disconnect between the government’s regulatory goals of
behavior modification with its goals of revenue generation.156 He notes that
these goals are “ultimately contradictory as success in changing public
behavior would negatively impact the potential of such taxation to raise
revenue.”157 More importantly, however, he suggests that the “tax” label
may implicitly send a message that reinforces existing bad norms and
contradicts the government’s regulatory goals:
A lesser explored approach to sin taxes is to analyze the implicit message of
this taxing strategy as a type of license to engage in the very conduct such
an instrument is directed to prevent. Pushing the implicit inquiry, it can be
argued that sin taxes extend beyond a mere gesture of acquiescence and
constitute a deliberate form of public forgiveness. Unlike most forms of
forgiveness that have been identified in the literature, sin tax seen as a
modern day indulgence may, in fact, promote a public health policy that is
both irresponsible and counterproductive.158

Thus, calling the shared responsibility payment a “tax” could send a
message that the tax is not only a legally equivalent choice to buying
insurance, but is equivalent as a moral or policy matter, which would
undermine the government’s primary goal of getting people to buy

154. Id. at 8. This criticism is borne out by polling as of July 2012. See KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL: JULY 2012, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.kff.
org/kaiserpolls/upload/8339-F.pdf [hereinafter KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL JULY 2012]
(“There is confusion over who will be subject to the tax penalty under the mandate: the poll
finds that one in five Americans believe they will have to pay a penalty in 2014, even as
experts suggest the share will be considerably smaller.”).
155. Avi-Yonah, supra note 153, at 8. This too is borne out by the July 2012 Kaiser poll:
“[U]pwards of six in ten [still view] the mandate unfavorably whether it is described as a ‘tax’ or
as a ‘fine.’” KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL JULY 2012, supra note 154.
156. John D. Blum, Sin Tax, Forgiveness and Public Health Governance 1-2 (Loyola Univ.
Chicago Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2012-010,
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=204267.
157. Id. at 2.
158. Id. at 1-2.
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insurance. If the tax is viewed as adequate compensation for the social cost
of failing to buy insurance, it creates implicit moral permission to stay
uninsured. This, in turn, means that one’s decision to buy insurance is more
likely to only turn on the kind of “private costs and benefits” referred to by
Cooter and Siegel.
Another question presented by the ACA mandate is why any incentive or
sanction is needed at all in light of what seems to be widespread public
understanding of the importance of, and desire for, health insurance.159
Unlike traditional sin taxes, the “health care tax” is not designed to prevent
or dampen behavior that people enjoy or to which they may even be
addicted. Rather the ACA’s tax/penalty operates as an additional incentive
to do something that would provide a clear benefit to people –– to be able
to access healthcare and avoid potentially ruinous financial debt. Indeed,
this was the assumption underlying President Obama’s initial resistance to a
mandate.
One cannot simply assume, however, that public expressions of a desire
for affordable insurance coverage will automatically translate into a decision
to buy insurance on the new health benefit exchanges, even if the ACA
makes insurance “affordable” by government’s standards. People often
express preferences or support policies as citizens (through voting, for
example) that may not be consistent with the personal decisions they make
in their day-to-day lives.160 Moreover, although the public may understand
the importance of insurance and even desire it in the abstract, whether any
individual values it enough to purchase it is a more complicated question.
The “benefit” of insurance may be valued differently based on one’s prior
experiences and anticipated health needs. And the cost of buying insurance
must be understood not only as its price (which is unpredictable), but in
terms of the value of trade-offs. Insurance deemed “affordable” under the
law will likely still require those without a lot of disposable income to give up

159. This is distinct from the narrower and more politicized (and misleading) question
about whether people supported President Obama’s healthcare reform (otherwise referred to
as “Obamacare”).
160. See Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, supra note 130, at 959-60 (“There is
an evident and pervasive difference between people’s choices as consumers and their choices
as citizens. This is because people are choosing quite different things. In their private capacity,
people may watch silly situation comedies; but they may also support, as citizens, the use of
government resources to assist public broadcasting. Some people seek stringent laws
protecting the environment or endangered species even though they do not use the public
parks or derive material benefits from protection of endangered species – and even though in
their private behavior, they are unwilling to do much to protect environmental amenities . . . .
[W]hat people favor as political participants can be different from what they favor as
consumers. It is in part for this reason that democratic outcomes are distinct from those that
emerge from markets.”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

310

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 6:267

other goods or services in order to be able to purchase insurance. The
trade-offs one is willing to make depends not only on how much consumers
value insurance, but also the importance or value of the goods they would
need to give up. It is impossible to predict how these trade-offs will factor
into each individual’s decision making, complicating even the more
traditional law and economic approach to predicting behavior.
Thus, both the “taxing” and “penalty” approaches create uncertainty
about what choices people will make under the law. But the
penalty/mandate rhetoric is more likely to create a powerful expressive
message that enables the federal government to achieve its regulatory goals
regardless of the amount of economic sanction. The next part considers
whether the ACA creates a sufficiently powerful expressive message to
influence people to buy insurance rather than pay the tax/penalty.
VI. THE ACA’S MORAL MANDATE: DEFINING THE MEANING OF CHOICE
In light of the fact that the ACA gives consumers a legal choice to not
buy insurance and that the economic sanctions are too low to exert
meaningful pressure on consumers to buy insurance, the federal
government will likely need to harness the ACA’s expressive power to
generate adequate consumer participation. This part takes a closer look at
the potential of this power. Sections A and B identify the norms that the ACA
is trying to change and create. Section C considers more specifically how
this expressive function may influence people’s behavior.
A.

Norms Pre-ACA

Few scholars have considered the expressive or norming function of
insurance. Deborah Stone provides one of the more in-depth discussions of
insurance, asserting that it “is a social institution that particularly invites
moral contemplation about suffering, compassion, and responsibility [and
in] so doing [] enlarges the public conception of social responsibility.”161
Unfortunately, prior to the ACA, we did not have a comprehensive national
discussion that allowed public contemplation about whether the health
policy decisions being made were fair, smart, and part of a coherent moral
philosophy about the role and responsibility of government and other actors
in the system. Rather, much of health policy has been crafted in a
piecemeal, incremental, and often opaque fashion. This does not mean that
it is impossible to identify norms or discern social meaning of action from
our pre-ACA healthcare delivery and financing system. But to the extent that

161. Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, in
EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 52, 54 (Tom Baker
& Jonathan Simon eds., 2002).
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program design or certain conduct by insurers, government, or individuals
has any social meaning, it is often the product of messages or norms that
arise unintentionally out of an incoherent patchwork of public entitlements
and private market experiences that can make meaning hard to discern.
Recall that the expressive value of law depends on clarity, visibility and the
meaning of signals, and context is critically important for drawing moral
inferences from action or inaction.162
1. Healthcare Financing Patchwork
In order to identify the norms and values communicated through the
pre-ACA system, it is first important to understand the system design,
including which groups have fallen through the cracks and why. Private
insurance coverage depends heavily on employment, and employmentbased insurance tends to be more affordable than insurance purchased on
the individual market, in part because of the greater bargaining power of
employers and a healthier pool of employees. But it is also more affordable
because of special legal protections for employees that prevent
individualized risk rating and denials of coverage, as well as favorable tax
treatment that creates significant financial incentives for employers to
subsidize the cost, reducing the premiums employees must pay.163 Those
without access to employment-based insurance –– especially those in lowwage positions and certain service sectors, part-time and temporary
employees, and the self-employed –– are left to fend for themselves in an
individual insurance market that is largely unregulated. Insurance
underwriting practices that were legal pre-ACA, such as denials of people
deemed too risky, exclusions of care that people need most, and risk rating,
have kept the people in greatest need of care from getting it.164 Moreover,
in the last several years frequent rate increases that have not been justified
actuarially have resulted in greater numbers of even “healthy” people being
effectively excluded from the market.165
Although there is no constitutional right for all citizens to healthcare,166
public programs like Medicare and Medicaid create statutory entitlements to

162. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, supra note 127, at 2040 (noting that the
“complex network of norms governing the purchase of insurance” makes it difficult to infer
social meaning from the failure of purchase insurance). In that case, Sunstein was talking
about whether any relevant judgment could be made about the lack of insurance for purposes
of determining tort liability.
163. See Hoffman, supra note 48.
164. Id. at 49.
165. Id.
166. One narrow exception is applied to those detained by the government. The Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” has been interpreted to
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insurance coverage for certain groups –– traditionally the elderly, those
disabled by illness or injury, very poor children, pregnant women, and some
families with children. This system has tended to exclude the working poor
and childless adults who are also effectively excluded from an insurance
market dominated by powerful insurers allowed to deny coverage or set
rates at prohibitively expensive levels. Millions of children also remained
uninsured under the old system because their families were not poor enough
to qualify for public insurance, yet were too poor to afford insurance in the
private individual insurance market. Finally, many documented immigrants
have also fallen into this category because federal law temporarily excludes
them from public benefits, and they often work in jobs that do not offer
health benefits.
It is also important to understand the individual and societal harms
suffered as a result of the coverage gaps that existed pre-ACA. Numerous
studies have shown that lack of insurance is an impediment to healthcare
access, contributes to poor health outcomes, and has been a significant
factor in many bankruptcies.167 Moreover, the individual and societal costs
of uninsurance have been growing in light of several troubling trends: job
loss caused by economic downturns; cost-shifting to privately insured
consumers and the government to subsidize uncompensated medical care;
unnecessary health expenditures to treat otherwise preventable conditions
and medical crises; and threats to the healthcare infrastructure, especially
the safety net providers serving large numbers of uninsured and Medicaid
beneficiaries. Healthcare reform is a response to this evidence of a growing
crisis.168
2. Government Messaging
One clear and consistent message from the federal government
regarding healthcare is that there is no constitutional right to healthcare,
and thus no legal duty by government to ensure affordable healthcare for
all. Unfortunately, some federal and state officials have also made off-hand
and inaccurate remarks suggesting that insurance is not even that important

require treatment for prisoners’ serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104 (1976).
167. See, e.g., Andrew P. Wilper et al., Health Insurance and Mortality in US Adults, 99
AM. JUR. PUB. HEALTH 2289, 2292 (2009); David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in
the United States, 2007: Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 743 (2009).
168. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(E) (2011) (citing Congressional findings that “[t]he
economy loses up to $207,000,000,000 a year because of the poorer health and shorter
lifespan of the uninsured. By significantly reducing the number of the uninsured, the
requirement, together with the other provisions of this Act, will significantly reduce this
economic cost.”).
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because people can always get care in the emergency room.169 Such
comments seem to reflect officials’ assumptions that there is no moral duty
on the government to ensure healthcare access beyond the emergency
room.
Nonetheless, the federal government has played an important role in
facilitating healthcare access, most visibly by creating public healthcare
entitlements for certain groups, and through less visible legal protections
and incentives that make it cheaper for some employees to purchase private
insurance through their employers. According to Stone, these are the kinds
of choices that invite moral contemplation about societal responsibility and
compassion, and public entitlements are commonly understood as reflecting
a moral duty to help those who are in need and “deserving”170 –– Medicaid
helps the extremely poor who are also vulnerable to exclusion by the private
market by virtue of their age, disability, or condition; Medicare helps
beneficiaries considered deserving by virtue of having paid into the system
and vulnerable due to advanced age. Each program has been expanded at
various times to include more people or certain categories of people who
seem to fit the “deserving” criterion. With each expansion or change to the
program, there is some moral contemplation and conversation about the
need for the expansion; but to the extent that social programs like this have
allowed “moral contemplation” to occur, it has tended to be in a very
segmented way, with each new policy narrowly focusing on particular
services or groups, and without meaningful participation and understanding
by the public at large.171 At the other end of the spectrum, economic and
legal protections for employees with access to employment-based insurance
has received a lot less public attention, which means even less opportunity
for an examination of the moral justification underlying these protections.
But in attempting to discern society’s values or norms as reflected by
these choices, one must also consider the government’s choices to exclude

169. See, e.g., Greg Sargent, Romney: Let Them Go to Emergency Rooms, WASHINGTON
POST OP-ED (Sep. 24, 2012), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plumline/post/romney-let-them-go-to-emergency-rooms/2012/09/24/3ac90b0e-0680-11e2-afffd6c7f20a83bf_blog.html (discussing Romney’s comments on a CBS interview); see also
Timothy Noah, The Emergency-Room Gap: Putting to Rest a Cherished Myth About the
Uninsured, SLATE.COM (Apr. 14, 2010), available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/prescripttions/2010/04/the_emergencyroom_gap.html.
170. See ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE
STUDY OF MEDICAID 57, 61–62 (1974); see also Guetzkow, supra note 50 at 174
(“‘Deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ are not categories that politicians and bureaucrats use when
devising social policy. Deservingness is instead a second-order analytic tool used by
researchers to help make sense of social policies – their scope, their generosity, and their
political appeal.”).
171. See generally STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 170.
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certain groups from the public system or to leave certain groups to fend for
themselves in a dysfunctional and largely unregulated private market. It is
unclear why, for instance, people forced to look to the individual market for
coverage should receive less government protection than those fortunate
enough to be employed by corporations wealthy and powerful enough to
bargain on their employees’ behalf, or why childless adults at the federal
poverty level are less deserving of government help than those with children.
If the government’s piecemeal approach to healthcare design reflects a
belief that certain groups are more “deserving” of compassion or help than
others, then this suggests a very narrow understanding of “social
responsibility” in healthcare. But to what extent are these beliefs consistent
with the prevailing attitudes of the rest of society? These choices help shape
norms with respect to insurance status: certain groups are more likely to be
insured than others. But they also raise questions about what meaning, if
any, attaches to the status of being insured or uninsured.
Pre-ACA, the social meaning of not having insurance was unclear
because of the complicated regulatory and market-based factors impacting
such decisions. For example, to the extent that failure to get insurance was
linked to unaffordability, some people experienced shame because of their
failure to earn enough to afford it –– this served as yet another indicia of
poverty which was also stigmatized. Interestingly, some of those eligible for
Medicaid have not enrolled in order to avoid the stigma or humiliation
associated with navigating a difficult and sometimes hostile bureaucracy that
requires people to prove their qualifications for help.
On the other hand, many have viewed the unaffordability of insurance
as a signal of the unfairness created by bad actors (insurers) in the private
system, a general moral failure of government to fix the problem, a lack of
concern by the government for the groups most at risk of falling through the
cracks, or some combination of all three. This sense of unfairness has grown
as greater numbers of people have suffered job loss and lost insurance due
to economic factors outside of their control. The implicit message received
by these groups was “You’re on your own” –– if you were not lucky enough
to have the right kind of job or deserving enough to receive direct
government help. For those at the greatest risk of uninsurance –– women,
racial and ethnic minorities, members of the LGBT community, and people
with a chronic condition or disability that was not totally disabling –– this
implicit message was potentially even more marginalizing and harmful.
Because these groups have been excluded and suffered discrimination more
broadly, especially in employment, they have fewer resources to spare and
are more vulnerable to falling through the coverage gaps. In this way, the
prior healthcare system could be seen as reinforcing a longstanding and
broader inequality that devalued these groups.
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One group further complicates attempts to glean pre-ACA norms: the
“young and healthy.” This group is too old to qualify as dependents on a
parent’s plan (if the parents are fortunate enough to have insurance), may
not have a job that provides insurance, and is least likely to be able to
appreciate the importance or value of paying for insurance as a young
adult. Lawmakers have either deliberately or inadvertently reinforced the
message that health insurance is not important for this group, by neglecting
them in health policy making and by repeatedly referring to them as the
“young and healthy.”
3. Messaging by Private Insurers
Discerning even implicit messages from private health insurers is a bit
more complicated. On the one hand, the practices described above send a
clear message that they do not want to cover people who are too “risky” —
they deny, or charge prohibitively expensive rates to, those most in need.
Insurance companies have also operated in other explicitly discriminatory
ways, such as redlining to avoid predominantly minority communities,
charging women rates higher than men, and disproportionately targeting
certain kinds of conditions for coverage exclusions or caps, like treatment
for HIV or mental healthcare.172 Such practices send a powerful message
that insurers view these groups as less desirable customers and their health
needs as less valuable. This in turn creates mistrust and resentment among
the very people the government will need to recruit for health reform to be
successful.
Insurers’ practices with more “desirable” (especially healthy) customers
are more complicated. While insurers want these customers and make them
the focus of marketing efforts, repeated rate increases without adequate
justification have forced many people to give up coverage before realizing
its value, creating some resentment and mistrust. But mistrust is likely highest
among those who have been subject to illegal rescissions or discovered that
their plan did not provide necessary coverage after becoming seriously ill.
The message implicitly sent: insurance is a luxury that only those with
resources can afford, and like any other business, insurers will do what they
can to limit expenditures and maximize profits, even if it means denying
people’s essential health needs.
Despite such confusing and apparently contradictory messages being
sent in the health insurance context, Stone provides an example of how
some private insurers have successfully leveraged their messaging power to
shape the meaning of insurance and influence behavioral norms in the life

172. See generally INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (2003).
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insurance context. She shows how in this context, marketing by private
insurers has played on and helped to construct notions of family
responsibility that make insurance a moral imperative:
In contemporary marketing, life insurance is still often portrayed as a way of
meeting one’s family obligations and even as a way of strengthening family
ties. “Another way to say ‘I love you’ is with good insurance protection,”
declares one of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ads, showing Lucy
(from Charles Schulz’s Peanuts comic strip) knitting a pair of baby
booties.173

In addition to this message of personal responsibility, Stone says that
insurers have also helped to “highlight the collective, mutual-aid aspect of
insurance and promote conversation about the contours of moral
responsibility in a community.”174 In this way, insurance can act as a “kind
of moral education of the citizenry.”175
Nonetheless, Stone acknowledges that this collective aspect of insurer
messaging can be harder to see in private insurance, “especially those
segments that are marketed and organized as individual policies instead of
group policies, [because they] may appear more as bilateral market
contracts rather than any kind of community-sponsored aid system.”176 The
opacity of the mechanics and regulatory environment of private insurance
also obscures the role of social and collective participation in the context of
group health insurance plans as well. Many people know it is easier to get
health insurance through their employer, but they do not understand what
role the government played in this. Nor do they understand the importance
of collective participation by a large and diverse pool of relatively healthy
people, which enables individuals to be responsible by purchasing
affordable coverage. Thus discerning norms or meaning in the pre-ACA
health insurance context is quite complicated: it is not clear what meaning,
if any, should be attached to one’s insurance status; it is not clear to what
extent the public viewed healthcare as an essential good and the
government’s piecemeal approach as a moral failure; and it is not clear to
what extent people embraced norms of individual or social responsibility.
The government’s explicit and implicit messages not only disclaimed
government responsibility for healthcare broadly, but also undermined the
possibility of discerning a clear social meaning from the state of being
uninsured. Mixed messages sent by private insurers engendered confusion

173. Stone, supra note 161, at 57-58.
174. Id. at 55. Stone also claims that “private insurance marketing is a cultural force that
legitimates social obligation and mutual aid [and also] weaves in a strong stand of individual
responsibility and self-help.” Id. at 58.
175. Id. at 61.
176. Id.
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and mistrust, and further ambiguated the meaning of insurance. What was
clear, however, was that the number of uninsured was growing, and policy
analysts were predicting that things would get worse. The state of being
uninsured was already a norm for some groups, and without government
intervention, the trend suggested a widening of this norm.
B.

The ACA’s Moral Mandate and Other Expressive Functions

When an existing norm is harmful or an impediment to individual and
societal well-being, it is appropriate for government to leverage its
expressive power to change these norms. And this is precisely what the ACA
tries to do. In addressing the need for healthcare reform, President Obama
acknowledged the troubling and harmful messages communicated as a
result of the government’s piecemeal approach. He also noted
inconsistencies between the government’s and the public’s understanding of
healthcare as an essential good and the government’s role in ensuring
healthcare access for all.177 He highlighted the unfairness of a system that
allowed for-profit insurers to control access, and government’s failure to
protect consumers who try to act responsibly by purchasing insurance only
to find themselves vulnerable to financial ruin or unable to get care because
of bad faith denials, illegal rescissions, or the sale of junk insurance.
Obama also criticized the fact that private insurance access has depended
primarily on certain kinds of employment, especially during a recession
when so many people were losing their jobs or did not have access to the
kinds of jobs that provided insurance.
Although health reform was not a radical federal transformation of the
healthcare system,178 the ACA does have transformative potential to redefine

177. See, e.g., Katherine Brandon, The President on Health Care: “We are Going to Get
this Done”, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 17, 2009, 5:42 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
The-President-on-Health-Care-We-are-Going-to-Get-this-Done; see also Peter Orszag, To
Save Money, Save the Health Care Act, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at A29; The Right Care at
the Right Time: Leveraging Innovation to Improve Health Care Quality for All Americans:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Finance United States Senate, 110th Cong. 57-69 (2008)
(statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Cong. Budget Office).
178. First, it does not create a “constitutional right to health care” nor is the federal
government entering the business of delivering care; rather it uses its regulatory power to
create a platform for a better functioning private market based largely on the kinds of
protections against exclusion and risk rating that already existed for employees, and by
strengthening the power to regulate rates that state regulators already had. Second, the
federal government continues to rely heavily on and give great deference to states in both the
structure and implementation of reform; it contemplates that it will have to play a significant
role in operating federal exchanges for residents of states that do not create their own, but this
does not seem to be the federal government’s preference. Finally, the ACA does not create a
universal or centralized system of healthcare financing for all; rather it builds on our existing
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the federal government’s normative commitment to ensuring affordable care
for all, and to create a shared sense of commitment and responsibility to
make this work. This transformative idea is embodied in the expressive
characteristics of the ACA, as well as lawmakers’ messaging about the ACA.
The ACA may not have created a true legal mandate, but this Part argues
that the federal government uses its expressive power through the ACA to
create a “moral mandate” for individuals to do their part by buying
insurance based on this transformative idea of shared responsibility.
As described earlier, the statutory language of the ACA uses mandatory
and punitive rhetoric in describing citizens’ obligations under the law. The
emphasis has been on the “individual coverage requirement” or mandate in
public conversations about the law. Moreover, the law requires people who
are subject to the mandate and fail to get insurance to pay a “shared
responsibility payment,” also referred to as a “penalty” throughout the law.
The label “shared responsibility payment” simultaneously expresses an
individual obligation to buy insurance and a collective obligation to
participate in a system in which everyone must share some responsibility for
ensuring affordable coverage. The penalty language suggests that failure to
buy insurance is wrongful behavior that deserves punishment, implicitly
signaling that buying insurance (and not making the shared responsibility
payment) is the “right” way to honor one’s individual obligation and duty to
the collective. Finally, as noted above, the government repeatedly
emphasized that increasing insurance coverage through the coverage
requirement is essential to creating effective health insurance markets,
making clear that an individual’s failure to buy insurance has broader
consequences that could hurt others’ ability to get care.
Importantly, this responsibility rhetoric does not just apply to individuals;
the ACA emphasizes a “shared responsibility” that reflects the government’s
new priority and commitment to consumer healthcare access. In this way,
the ACA attempts to counter the prior message of “You’re on your own”
with a message that is more consistent with Obama’s 2012 campaign
message, “We’re in this together.” Through the ACA, the government
emphasizes a new commitment with benefits and responsibilities, and tries to
educate people about the extent to which everyone’s success and well-being
is already connected: if people come together in the new health benefit
exchange, then this collective action can help ensure affordable insurance
and a fair playing field for everyone; this, in turn, allows people to exercise
their individual moral responsibility to buy insurance. Like messaging by
private insurers in the life insurance context, the ACA’s message is one of

public-private system of financing and delivery, a system that continues to be fragmented and
depend on the voluntary participation of private insurers, providers, and consumers alike.
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collective aid, with a healthy dose of personal responsibility; but in this case,
the message is more visible and clear, due in large part to President
Obama’s use of his bully pulpit in explaining the law.
The government’s own moral and legal commitment to ensure
affordable and meaningful coverage is a critical part of this message
because this commitment is important for people’s acceptance of the
mandate. For example, although polling showed the mandate itself was
controversial, people were more likely to be supportive of the mandate if a
public option was included –– likely because this was the clearest proxy for
government’s assurance of affordability and meaningful protection.179 If
consumers are being told to put their money (and faith) into a private
insurance market mistrusted for so long, they will understandably be
skeptical. But if consumers view the exchanges as vehicles through which
government will protect them and help them get the care they need, the
mandate is part of a reciprocal responsibility between government and
individuals that makes it much more palatable. Indeed, polling shows that
many people are predisposed to a collective system that combines mutual
aid and individual responsibility. For example, when people who supported
the mandate were asked to explain why in their own words, 32% said
because everyone needs healthcare/insurance, 17% said it expands
coverage, 16% said people should pay their fair share, and 15% said it
controls costs.180 The same poll found that some people originally opposed
to the mandate, changed their mind once they were informed about why the
mandate was necessary181 and that it would not take away their
employment-based healthcare.182 Other surveys show that significant

179. See, e.g., ISABELLA FURTH ET AL., VIEWPOINT LEARNING, INC., HEALTH COVERAGE FOR ALL
CALIFORNIANS: CATCHING UP WITH THE PUBLIC: A REPORT WITH THE PUBLIC AND WITH BUSINESS
AND CIVIC LEADERS (2006), available at http://www.viewpointlearning.com/wp-content/up
loads/2011/04/Health_Coverage_for_All_Californians.pdf [hereinafter HEALTH COVERAGE FOR
ALL CALIFORNIANS] (determining public views on health reform through education and dialogue
that considered significant healthcare reforms, as opposed to simply polling people about
piecemeal or incremental approaches).
180. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 29, at 2.
181. See id. at 3 (noting that public support for the mandate goes up depending on which
messages or information opponents receive). The following information caused support for the
mandate to increase: “. . . without such a requirement, insurance companies would still be
allowed to deny coverage to people who are sick;” “. . . people would not be held to this
requirement if the cost of new coverage would consume too large a share of their income;”
“. . . without such a requirement, people may wait until they are seriously ill to buy health
insurance, which will drive up health insurance costs for everyone.” Id.
182. Id. (“Perhaps surprisingly, the most effective information in terms of changing people’s
minds is the basic reminder that ‘under the reform law, most Americans would still get
coverage through their employers and so would automatically satisfy the requirement without
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numbers of people are willing to pay more so that others can afford care.183
By adopting a more proactive and explicit consumer protection role, the
government is sending a message to people that such a system can exist
and will be created through the health benefit exchanges.
This commitment is not limited to ensuring access to affordable
insurance; the ACA’s “Patient Protection” part of the message includes a
commitment to ensure a benefits package that is meaningful. As an
instrument of social reform, insurance has performed a standard-setting role
in many arenas, and the federal government is using the ACA to help define
a moral and legal baseline for care that is deemed essential and furthers
equity goals.184 Although the ACA left this guarantee of “essential health
benefits” substantially undefined, and the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) punted responsibility for this to the states,185 the federal
government has affirmed this commitment in other ways. Mandating that
preventive care be covered without copayments is one example of this.186
And HHS has used its expressive power to affirm its commitment to equity,
specifically for groups that have been either excluded or not able to get
meaningful benefits in the prior system due to express or more subtle forms
of discrimination. Women, people with mental health conditions, and
people with HIV are a few of the groups that the Administration has targeted
with messages of inclusion and assurances that prior inequities or
discrimination would be eliminated.187
Finally, the ACA does not simply focus on the financial costs and
benefits of insurance; healthcare access is really at the heart of the ACA’s
messaging and even its title, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
reveals that insurance is simply a means toward this end. During Obama’s

having to buy any new insurance.’ After hearing that message, favorable views of the mandate
went up 28 percentage points to 61%.”).
183. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., SUPPORT FOR HEALTH CARE OVERHAUL, BUT IT’S NOT
1993 (2009), available at http://www.people-press.org/2009/03/19/support-for-health-careoverhaul-but-its-not-1993/.
184. See Stone, supra note 161, at 63.
185. State Selection of Benchmark, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,644, 70,648 (Nov. 26, 2012) (to be
codified at 45 C.F.R. § 156.100).
186. ACA § 1302(b)(1)(I) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2011)).
187. See, e.g., News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Secretary Sebelius
Announces Public-Private Partnerships to Turn the Tide Together in Fight Against HIV/AIDS
(Jul. 22, 2012), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/07/20120722a.html;
News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Health Care Law Gives Women Control
over Their Care, Offers Free Preventive Services to 47 Million Women (Jul. 31, 2012),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2012pres/07/20120731a.html; News Release,
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Health Care Law Increases Number of Mental and
Behavioral Health Providers (Sep. 25, 2012), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/
2012pres/09/20120925a.html.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

A MORAL MANDATE & THE MEANING OF CHOICE

321

speeches about health reform, he emphasized how insurance helps people
get the right care at the right time –– such as preventive care and on-going
monitoring of chronic conditions to prevent the kind of crises that lead to
hospitalization and more serious and costly problems down the line.188 Thus
insurance is also important because of the behavioral effects it can have ––
by encouraging people to access preventive and regular care through a
“medical home,”189 insurance serves a teaching function that promotes
greater individual responsibility with respect to managing health and
promoting wellness.190 In this way, the ACA treats insurance as an
“instrument of social reform,” seeking not only to change norms around
insurance status, but expecting coverage to facilitate greater understanding,
access, and responsibility in personal health management more
generally.191
Thus, through the ACA, the government is emphasizing the moral
responsibility to get (and use) insurance –– a “moral mandate.” But this is
only one part of the message –– the moral mandate is part of a new
government commitment to society’s health and well-being, as well as to
equity in healthcare. It is also an acknowledgment of the important
regulatory role government must play in facilitating the kind of collective
action and shared responsibility that makes insurance affordable,
accessible, and meaningful for everyone on equal terms. The moral
mandate’s expressive force depends on the government’s ability to transform
the culture of insurance and healthcare in ways that overcome the
longstanding apathy, confusion, mistrust, or isolationist feelings generated
by the harmful messages and norms that defined the pre-ACA healthcare
market.

188. See Brandon, supra note 177.
189. The concept of a medical home is defined as a “cultivated partnership between the
patient, family, and primary provider in cooperation with specialists and support from the
community.” What is a Medical Home? Why is it Important?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., http://www.hrsa.gov/healthit/toolbox/Childrenstoolbox/BuildingMedicalHome/whyim
portant.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2013).
190. See Stone, supra note 161, at 62-63 (“Insurance is a form of what Foucauldian
scholars call ‘discipline,’ that is, a system of inculcating norms, supervising behavior, and
enforcing compliance with norms . . . . [For example], [p]roponents of mandatory automobile
liability insurance believe insurance ‘was a way of inculcating a sense of responsibility toward
others, teaching the importance of careful driving, and compelling automobile owners to
assume financial responsibility for the consequences of their driving.’”).
191. We see this at the federal level with an emphasis on preventive care, medical homes,
and tools to encourage better patient education and communication by providers in patient
self-management. This is also evident as stakeholders and exchange officials discuss how to
not only make insurance accessible, but how to help newly insured consumers understand and
realize its benefits, especially for those chronically uninsured populations who have already
developed habits of delaying seeking care until it becomes too late.
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C. Implications of the ACA’s Moral Mandate: Defining the Meaning of
Choice
Part V revealed how government can expressively influence decisions
about health and safety, as well as high stakes financial decisions in the
private market place, in the absence of legal enforcement or sanctions.
Moreover, Part VI.B noted that private insurance companies were successful
in their own marketing attempts to shape the meaning of having life
insurance as a signal of responsibility. Both kinds of decisions are implicated
by the ACA’s coverage requirement, which confronts consumers with a
choice between purchasing insurance or paying the tax/penalty –– a choice
with important health and financial implications. This part considers the
ways in which the ACA’s expressive mandate to buy insurance may influence
this choice.
As should be clear from the above discussion, for many people a moral
mandate does not necessarily create a new social meaning as much as it
reflects the underlying attitudes of a community that already has a strong
sense of personal responsibility to buy insurance and a willingness to
participate in a system that ensures affordable healthcare coverage for
all.192 For this group, the most important expressive function of the ACA is
the government’s commitment to remove existing impediments and make
the market more transparent and fair. This commitment is clearest when
considering the private and public insurance reforms together –– the
Medicaid expansion eliminated eligibility categories based on anachronistic
assumptions of vulnerability and worth, and the mandate to buy insurance
only applies to people who can afford to do so with the help of government
subsidies and regulation designed to ensure affordability. In this way, the
government signals to the public that it is using its power to fill in coverage
gaps by addressing a collective action problem arising out of a fragmented
healthcare system and dysfunctional individual insurance market, a problem
that states have been unwilling or unable to solve.
It also signals that government will serve an important coordinating
function to ensure the kind of collective participation that is necessary to
ensure the new market will work, with health exchanges serving as this
coordinating mechanism. Thus the moral mandate is important, but as an
affirmation and reflection of those beliefs that had previously been obscured
or could not be actualized because of market and regulatory failures
beyond individuals’ control. In this way, the ACA serves an important
educative function –– explaining regulatory and market changes that will
enable people to act in ways that are more consistent with their internal
norms of personal and social responsibility.

192. See McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, supra note 127, at 362.
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There are two groups of people for whom the expressive function may
need to do heavier lifting. The first is the group commonly referred to as the
“young and healthy.” This group is less likely to have dependents (that
would have triggered the responsibility norm even pre-ACA), and may be
less likely to appreciate the health and financial benefits of insurance. Yet
attracting these “healthy” members is critical to achieving a diverse enough
pool to keep rates affordable. Indeed, this group is considered a primary
target of the mandate. For these reasons, creating a moral obligation to
participate in the system may be more challenging. Here again, the ACA’s
educative function about the importance of their participation is what gives
the moral mandate expressive force, and there are two important educative
components. The ACA is a good platform to try to debunk the myth that
young means healthy or that these adults do not need to think about
healthcare yet. For example, some of the stories told and statistics cited
throughout the debate and in NFIB193 help illustrate this problem, though
the constant rhetorical use of the label “young and healthy” likely
undermines this message.
An equally important challenge is for government to educate these
groups about the serious health and financial stakes driving healthcare
reform, and the fact that reforms to ensure affordable and meaningful
coverage will only work with a significant collective commitment to
participate in this new system. To decide to gamble by not buying insurance
has profound implications for others’ ability to access insurance ––
especially those most in need. In light of these social costs, one is not free,
at least as a moral matter, to treat the decision to buy health insurance as
an individual problem subject to one’s own cost-benefit analysis. As noted
above, polling suggests some people already have an internal sense of
fairness and appreciation for the collective good that might encourage them
to comply with a mandate once they understand the implications.
For those without this internal norm, or where this norm is not enough to
overcome an unfavorable cost-benefit analysis, the ACA may still influence
their behavior, by stigmatizing the failure to purchase insurance as freeriding and not doing one’s fair share. To the extent the Obama
Administration is successful at creating a market that is more accessible and
affordable, more people will become insured. The social meaning of
uninsurance changes if the promise of affordability is realized –– no longer
will people be able to blame the market or government’s regulatory failures.
Discerning a clear meaning may still be tricky though. Unless one admits to
paying the assessment, lack of insurance could still mean that one cannot
193. Although it did not seem to penetrate the joint dissenters’ understanding of the
problem, Ginsburg relies on such statistics heavily in her dissent on the commerce question.
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2611 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting in part, concurring in part).
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afford it. Evidence of the correct meaning may not be easily visible, and thus
it may be more difficult to create the kind of stigmatizing effect that would
influence behavior. In contrast to the case of underwater mortgages, there
also may not be enough opportunities in the healthcare context for the kind
of frequent shaming needed to increase the social cost of foregoing
insurance. This is an example of how the complexity of the law can
undermine its moral mandate in ways that make the message less powerful.
The final category, and one that poses another significant challenge, is
the group of people ideologically opposed to the ACA. Ideological
opposition was salient in the political attacks on reform; these attacks
reflected a struggle over the definition of social norms and the meaning of
insurance and evidenced a deep philosophical divide about the proper role
of government and individuals’ responsibility to the broader community.
Opponents characterized the mandate as an invasion of individual liberty
and threat to freedom; “freedom,” in turn, was defined as the freedom to
not buy insurance or the kind of insurance required by government.194 If not
buying insurance is a symbol of their resistance to government’s
infringement on their liberty and government’s attempt to redefine social
norms to “socialize” health risk, then the failure to buy insurance will not be
stigmatizing and this group will not be vulnerable to social shaming on this
basis. Depending on how deeply this philosophical opposition runs, this
group is unlikely to be swayed by a moral mandate justified by how it serves
the collective good.
On the other hand, many of those ideologically opposed to the reform
and the mandate, may have a strong internal sense of personal
responsibility that would lead them to take advantage of the protections and
subsidies offered in the new system once up and running. Much of the
opposition to the reform seemed based on wrong information about the law
–– for example, that it was a federal takeover that would install death panels
and hurt Medicare beneficiaries.195 In fact, polls and surveys show a

194. Proponents have challenged the reality of this construction, arguing that meaningful
liberty includes health and that real freedom to get and pay for healthcare cannot exist without
government regulation of markets that make insurance affordable and meaningful.
195. See Angie Drobnic Holan, Top 5 Falsehoods about the Health Care Law,
POLITIFACT.COM (Jun. 27, 2012, 5:54 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/
2012/jun/27/top-5-falsehoods-about-health-care-law/ (listing as the top five false claims
about health reform that it is a government takeover of healthcare, that people could be jailed
for not buying insurance, that the law rations care and denies treatments, and that it would
create “death panels”). But see Sidney D. Watson, Metaphors, Meaning, and Health Reform,
54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1313, 1314 (2010) (noting that some statements, for instance people
speaking out about “death panels,” “government rationing” and “getting government out of
Medicare” do not necessarily reflect ignorance about health reform; rather these words are
metaphors that reflect the moral values of those opposing reform).
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disconnect between people’s opposition to the health reform law proposed
by Obama, especially when phrased as support for “Obamacare” or the
“Affordable Care Act,” and their support for many of the same consumer
protections and market reforms when asked about these outside of the
context of the ACA.196 More importantly, when people are given information
that educates them about the various reform proposals and they are
encouraged to engage in a meaningful dialogue about the strengths and
weaknesses of different approaches outside of the political context (like the
explosive town hall meetings led by law-makers), people’s positions change
in ways that often defy typical partisan divides.197
Now that the legal fate of reform has been settled, and the polarizing
rhetoric is starting to die down, policy-makers and consumer organizations
can do the kind of outreach that will engage the public in these more
constructive ways. As we move into implementation, it should be easier to
ensure that people receive more objective and accurate information about
the ACA and how it will impact them.198 This paves the way for the ACA to
serve an educative function that, if successful, may reveal people’s true
preferences as their own sense of personal and familial responsibility leads
them to take advantage of the new subsidies and legal protections that
empower them to purchase health insurance on the exchanges.199 Indeed,
one of the criticisms of Republican or conservative opposition was that it was
196. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL: MARCH 2012, at 10 (2012),
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8285-F.pdf [hereinafter KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL
MARCH 2012] (“One of the consistent contradictions in public opinion on the ACA is this:
while the law as a whole has never gained majority support, its component parts – from the
relatively narrow to the core and comprehensive – have been consistently popular over the
past two years, with the glaring exception of the individual mandate. And many provisions of
the law are popular even among Republicans.”).
197. See, e.g., HEALTH COVERAGE FOR ALL CALIFORNIANS, supra note 179.
198. See KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL MARCH 2012, supra note 196, at 6. (“[F]or the
average American, the ACA is not yet real. Despite passage, and because of the longer term
implementation framework, for many it seems to remain a remote political debate, one of
many taking place against the backdrop of a public clearly cynical about the capacities of its
political leaders. And from that perspective, the widespread level of confusion Americans
express over the law is less surprising.”). The poll also notes continued misperceptions about
the law, including 36% who believe that the law creates a government panel to make end-oflife decisions for people on Medicare, also known as the “death panels.” Id. at 7. Only a little
over half of those polled were familiar that the law provisions that prove generally more
popular with the public, such as the basic benefits package, subsidies, guaranteed issue, tax
credits to small businesses, no cost sharing for preventive services, and a medical loss ratio
that assures a certain percentage of premiums are spent on medical care. Id.
199. See id. (finding that of those opposing health reform, a larger proportion say this is
based in part on their displeasure with the direction of the country or government, than say it
is based on what they know about the law, and that division over the ACA reflects a partisan
divide).
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hypocritical –– the mandate embodied a notion of personal responsibility
that seemed quintessentially Republican, and which, not surprisingly,
originated out of a conservative think tank.200
In fact, we have seen these kinds of trends at the state level among
officials who have initially resisted health expansion but then ultimately
embraced it. For example, when first enacted Medicaid was vigorously
resisted by some states, but today it has 100% state participation. And we
are starting to see this unfold in the case of states deciding whether to
participate in the Medicaid expansion or establish health benefit exchanges.
Even some of the most vocal state opponents to reform are coming to terms
with the reality of their options: states can participate in a system that allows
them to benefit from generous federal funding to expand healthcare for their
constituents, while at the same time allowing them to retain a great deal of
control over system design; if not, states risk being viewed by their
constituents as shirking a moral responsibility to help ensure the health and
safety of its people, and they ultimately relinquish significant control of their
citizens’ access to private insurance to the federal government.201
But attempts to win over ideological opponents will be challenging. As
Professor Sidney Watson has explained in her paper, Metaphors, Meaning,
and Health Reform,202 lawmakers cannot expect that simply educating
people about the facts of healthcare reform will lead them to behave
rationally –– either in their own best interest or for the collective good.
Rather lawmakers must be conscious about framing, tailoring their
messages in a way that resonates with these groups’ own moral values.203
VII. CONCLUSION: CONCEIVING THE ACA AFTER NFIB
The theme of “choice” has played a critical role in the health reform
debate and legal challenges. Its importance in NFIB is clear as it determined
the fate of both the public and private insurance parts of reform. It was used
by the Court to save the law, but it also underscored an uncertainty that
could undermine reform’s success.
The implications of choice are perhaps more prominent in the other big
substantive question the Court took up –– whether the Medicaid expansion
was constitutional. The Medicaid expansion was structured as an
amendment, which meant that continued participation in Medicaid (and
thus a state’s existing Medicaid funding) was contingent on the state’s
200. Michael Cooper, Conservatives Sowed Idea of Health Care Mandate, Only to Spurn It
Later, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/15/health/policy/
health-care-mandate-was-first-backed-by-conservatives.html?_r=0.
201. Ezra Klein, A Medicaid Offer too Good to Refuse, WASH. POST, July 3, 2012, at A12.
202. See generally Watson, supra note 195, at 1313.
203. Id. at 1314-15.
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participation in the expansion.204 It was successfully challenged under the
Tenth Amendment as coercive because the Court found that the states did
not have a “genuine choice” about whether to participate.205 Choice was
also important in crafting the remedy: the Court held that this constitutional
violation could be remedied simply by ruling that the expansion was not an
amendment to the program enforceable by threat of withdrawal of existing
Medicaid funds.206 It relied on a severability clause in the Medicaid Act to
preserve the expansion as a true choice for the states (also termed the “redstate” option) rather than taking the dissent’s approach to strike down the
entire expansion and eliminating the ability for any state to participate.207
After the decision, there was a flurry of speculation and questions by media,
health advocates, and state officials about what this would mean for the fate
of reform: Now that states had a choice to participate, would this undermine
reform goals?208
Unlike the Medicaid coercion holding, the Court’s decision to uphold
the mandate under the taxing power did not create new choice in the law. It
merely reflected a legal reality and counter narrative about the choice that
existed prior to NFIB, but did not get much attention. NFIB’s decision
implicitly and explicitly reflects assumptions about consumer decisionmaking that underscores uncertainty about the ACA’s goals of increased
insurance coverage, in light of this element of choice. To the extent that
NFIB changes the reform narrative to one that emphasizes choice, this could
undermine reform enrollment goals. But the federal government, in
conjunction with state and private partners, can leverage the expressive
power of the ACA to educate people about the reciprocal benefits and
responsibilities that are critical for expanding affordable care and to shape
new norms that reflect a collective commitment to make the system work.
Indeed, government must successfully define the meaning of the choice
provided in the ACA in a way that instills this moral obligation and sense of
shared responsibility if healthcare reform is to succeed.

204. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606-07.
205. Id. at 2603-05 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., and Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); Id. at 2657-66
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
206. Id. at 2602-07 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., and Breyer & Kagan, JJ.); Id. at 2642
(opinion of Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ.).
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., Michael Cooper, Many Governors Are Still Unsure About Medicaid
Expansion, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2012, at A17; Aaron Carroll, Why Medicaid expansion is key
part of health reform, CNN.COM (July 5, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/05/opinion/
carroll-medicaid-expansion/index.html.
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